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The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation:
International and Comparative Perspectives*
Kenneth W. Dam**

I. INTRODUCTION
The global subprime crisis that erupted in mid-2007 unleashed a torrent of
analysis in the US.' Its impact in some other countries equaled or exceeded that
This paper reflects a number of informal talks and more formal lectures I gave in 2007 and 2008
in Frankfurt, Bonn, Berlin, Bamberg, Halle, Schloss Elmau (Bavaria), and Munich in connection
with my work in Germany under the 2007-08 Raimar List Prize awarded by the Humboldt and
Thyssen Foundations. In the Autumn of 2008, the subprime crisis (which erupted just as I arrived
in Germany in the summer of 2007) morphed into a full-scale credit crisis and then into a
worldwide recession. Analyses appearing during those later periods, as well as in the run-up to the
G20 summit conferences in April and September 2009, threw considerable light on the issues that
had earlier been at the center of the discussion of the subprime crisis. I have therefore relied on
those later publications and discussions in a number of US and international forums in
considering proposed reforms.
I thank the two foundations listed above for their support and my three German host institutions
(the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, the Institute for Law and Finance in Frankfurt, and
the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin) for their hospitality, my fellow members of the
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee for ongoing discussions, as well as the following readers
of prior drafts for their penetrating comments: George Kaufman, Roger Kubarych, Robert Litan,
Vikram Mehta, Richard Posner, and Kenneth Scott.
Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American and Foreign Law and Senior Lecturer, The University
of Chicago Law School.
The subprime crisis is usually dated as arising in August 2007 because that is the month when
commercial paper financing of the purchase of mortgage securities dried up. But, particularly in
retrospect, it is possible to date it earlier in 2007. For example, in February 2007, New Century
Financial, a large subprime mortgage originator, made headlines by going bankrupt. In July 2007,
several Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed. See Fed Chairmen and Presidents. Roundtable with Roger
Kubaych and Richard Whalen, Inst Risk Analyst (Institutional Risk Analytics 2008), online at
http://usl.instiutionalriskanalytics.com/pub/IRAstory.asp?tag=320
(visited Nov 21, 2009)
(relating remarks of Roger Kubarych, Chief US Economist of UniCredit Global Research, on the
breakdown of the financial system). See also Edward Gramlich, Subptime Mortgages: America'sLatest

Chicago Journalof InternationalLaw

in the US, in part because financial institutions elsewhere in the world purchased
securities issued by US-based financial institutions and secured by mortgages on
US real estate.'
The spread of the subprime crisis abroad has several implications. The
reach and impact of the "made in America" subprime crisis has generated an
urgent international issue engaging many central banks and finance ministries, as
well as a wide variety of international bodies, especially the Basel-based
international institutions, such as the Financial Stability Forum (renamed the
Financial Stability Board in 2009) and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision. The purchasers of these US mortgage securities were not simply
victims. Many of the world's most sophisticated banks bought these securities,
usually without doing their own investigation and analysis and almost certainly
without adequate due diligence. And they did so because, like many US
purchasers, they sought higher returns than elsewhere available.
The underlying theme of this paper is thus that an analysis of the subprime
crisis and proposed solutions is incomplete if international and comparative
perspectives are not brought to bear. Contrary to popular impression,
securitization (the pooling of loans, including mortgage loans, into securities) is
common throughout the world.' In Germany, mortgage-backed securities have
been common for at least 200 years.4 In Asia, securitization markets are growing,

2

Boom and Bust (Urban Institute 2007); Greg Ip, Did GreenipanAdd to Subprime Woes?, Wall St J B1
(Gune 9, 2007). For a chronology of relevant events in the early months of 2007, see Claudio
Barrio, The FinancialTurmoil of 2007-?. A PreliminagAssessment and Some Poliy Considerations,Bank
for Intl Settlements Working Paper 251 at 26 (2008) (providing a chronology of key events
between April 2, 2007 and February 28, 2008 relating to the financial crisis).
According to an April 2008 report of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), "subprimerelated losses" reported as of March 2008 totaled $288 billion, of which $144 billion were
incurred in the US and $123 billion in Europe. The IMF estimated that additional expected losses
of $95 billion would be incurred, of which $49 billion would be incurred in the US and $43 billion
in Europe. Global FinancialStability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring FinancialSoundness,
IMF World Econ & Fin Surveys 52 (Apr 2008). A later IMF report in October 2008 pointed to
additional losses but on a non-comparable basis. GlobalFinancialStabilio Report FinancialStress and
Deleveraging, MicrofinancialImplications and Polig, IMF World Econ & Fin Surveys 17, 67 (Oct 2008).
With the advent of the full-scale credit crisis, losses multiplied and it was no longer meaningful to
attempt to estimate what portion was attributable to subprime issuances and what proportion was
attributable to broader causes. For information on overall credit losses (not limited to subprime
securities or securitization) and on related economic losses, see Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation ("CCMR"), The GlobalFinancialCrisis.A PlanforRegulatoy Reform 7-11 (May 26, 2009).

3

See Theodor Baums and Eddy Wymeersch, eds, Asset-Backed SecutiiZaion in Europe 3-7 (Kuwer
1996); Theodor Baums, Asset SecuritiZation in Europe3 (Forum Internationale 1994).

4

Baums and Wymeersch, Asset-Backed SecurifiZation in Europeat 87-88 (cited in note 3).
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in part because of the underdeveloped state of Asian bond markets.5 Indeed, US
authorities have often looked to European precedents for reform. For example,
a US Secretary of the Treasury called for adoption of the European institution of
"covered bonds" for financing home mortgages.6
As C.A.E. Goodhart has pointed out, the crisis was "an accident waiting
and ready to happen"7 based on very low interest rates in the US, UK and the
Eurozone; the "Great Moderation" (an unparalleled period of low and stable
inflation); and the tendency of the Federal Reserve during the chairmanship of
Alan Greenspan to increase liquidity and lower target interest rates promptly
whenever financial markets weakened sharply, also known as the "Greenspan
8
put."
In many respects, this crisis was foreseen in advance. Almost every central
bank which published a Financial Stability Review, and international
financial institutions, such as the BIS and IMF, which did the same, had
been pointing for some time prior to the middle of 2007 to a serious underpricing of risk. This was characterised by very low risk spreads, with
differentials between risky assets and safe assets, having declined to
historically low levels. Volatility was unusually low. Leverage was high, as
financial institutions sought to add to yield, in the face of very low interest
rates. Those same institutions were apparently prepared to move into
increasingly risky assets in order to do so, often leveraging themselves
several times in pursuit of that objective. 9
The Goodhart analysis suggests that the subprime crisis would not have
occurred if it had not been for very low interest rates, the Great Moderation, and
the Greenspan put. But the crisis did occur and it centered on the subprime
mortgage market. Perhaps that was because of a factor not discussed by
Goodhart: the long period of steadily increasing US housing real estate values
that led to a popular view that home prices would continue to appreciate and
certainly would not fall. But prices did stop rising, and in fact fell with resulting
widespread mortgage defaults.' ° But since Goodhart's three factors (minus
5

Eiichi Sekine, Kei Kodachi, and Tetsuya Kamiyama, The Development and Future of Securiifation in
Asia, Draft for the 4th Annual Brookings-Tokyo Club Conference 3-4 (Oct 16, 2008), online at
www.tcf.or.jp/data/20081016_SekineKodachiKamiyama.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).

6

Covered bonds will be discussed later in this paper. See Section V.D.

7

C.A.E. Goodhart, The Background to the 2007 FinancialCrisis, 4 J Intl Econ & Econ Policy 331, 340
(2008).

8

Id at 332-33.

9

Id at 331.
See David Rubenstein, The Impact of the Financial Services Meltdown on the Global Economy and the
at
7, 15 (Oct 15, 2008), online
Group
Private Equity Industiy, Carlyle
http://wikileaks.org/leak/caryle-group-financial-crisis-2008.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). On the
role of housing price increases, see Robert J. Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today's Global
FinancialCrisis Happenedand What to Do About It 29-85 (Princeton 2008).

10
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arguably the Greenspan Put), as well as steadily rising home prices were, until
recently, common in many countries and particularly in Europe, a comparative
country analysis of financial regulation is justified. This comparative approach is
particularly appropriate in view of the fact that some of the weak aspects of US
practice-notably off-balance sheet vehicles such as structured investment
vehicles (SIVs) and conduits-were also found elsewhere, particularly in
German banking.
A factor that became increasingly obvious as the 2007 subprime crisis
evolved into the 2008 credit crisis was the excessive leverage in the economies
and particularly in the banks of the US and Europe.12 However, household
leverage was greater in the US than in Europe, especially more than in Germany
where household leverage has been relatively unpopular with most German
families. Aggregate US household debt rose from approximately 50 percent of
annual income in 1980 to roughly 100 percent in 2007.'3 This rise was associated
not just with the housing boom and the refinancing of home mortgages to
extract equity for personal consumption, but also with the popularity of credit
cards as a way to boost personal consumption even for people without houses
or other real estate. Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) show that German personal savings rates have remained
at or above the 10 percent level while US personal savings rates fell deeply into

11

12

13

The European Central Bank has a mandate focused on fighting inflation, whereas the Federal
Reserve has, by statute, a dual mandate of fighting inflation while also promoting growth and
employment, leading to different policies. This statutory mandate long preceded Greenspan's
tenure as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and may be attributed to populist and/or political
attitudes in the US Congress. As a result of its prime focus on inflation, the European Central
Bank has, at least until quite recently, been less willing than the Federal Reserve to reduce interest
rates in times of weak economic growth. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that
the Federal Reserve, which had lowered rates and increased the money supply to fight the short
recession at the beginning of the decade, continued that policy for too long. See John B. Taylor,
Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolongedand Worsened the Financial
Crisis 1-6 (Hoover Inst 2009).
Leverage in the financial sector rose in part because, taking the case of the US, the "share of
lending by US banks to the US financial sector-instead of to the real economy-went from 60
per cent of the outstanding loan stock in 1980 . . . to more than 80 per cent in 2007." Dirk
Bezemer, Lending Must Support the Real Economy, Fin Times (Nov 5, 2009), online at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/547d2fd8-c977-1lde-aO71-OO144feabdcO.html
(visited Nov 21,
2009).
See Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the GlobalBanking Crisis
("Turner Review") 18, Exhibit 1.10 (2009), online at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/
turner_review.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).

Vol. 10 No. 2

The Subprime Crisis and FinancialRegulation

Dam

in this past decade, and even beyond into negative territory on
single digits
14
occasion.

In the financial sector, leverage was exploited more in Europe than in the
US. European banks were leveraged to a far greater extent than US banks: "The
dozen largest European banks have now on average an overall leverage ratio
(shareholder equity to total assets) of 35, compared to less than 20 for the largest
US banks.""i In 2007, the leverage ratio (defined as total assets to equity) was
63.9 for UBS, 54.5 for Deutsche Bank, and 52.7 for Barclays Bank. 16 The extent
of the leverage was not widely known at the time because regulatory authorities
used measures such as "Tier 1 equity" and not the gross leverage measure of
total assets to equity (that is, common stock only, not counting preferred stock
or hybrid securities such as debt convertible into common stock). So, for
example, Deutsche Bank's gross leverage grew from under thirty to well over
fifty between 2003 and 2009, while its Tier 1 regulatory measure remained
essentially flat. 17 According to one important study, banks in Germany used
leverage to a greater extent than banks in any of the other eleven financially
most significant countries in the world. 18 The problem of high European bank

14

15

16

17

18

See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), Household Net Saving
Rates (Apr 13, 2007), online at http://www.swivel.com/datasets/spreadsheet/1004855 (visited
Nov 21, 2009).
Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi, Gros and Micossi: The Beginning of the End Game.. ., in Andrew
Felton and Carmen M. Reinhart, eds, 2 The First GlobalFinancialCrisis of the 21st Centuy 317, 319
(VoxEU.org 2009), online at http://www.voxeu.org/reports/reinhart feltonvol2/FirstGlobalCrisisVol2.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). Consider Global FinancialStabiliy Report. Financial
Stress (cited in note 2). Even under a Basel I risk-weighted approach (as opposed to a pure
leverage ratio, in which bank assets are not risk-weighted), US banks were considerably more
conservative (that is, more highly capitalized) than EU banks. See Rym Ayadi, Basel II
Implementation in the Midst of Turbulence, Centre for European Policy Studies Task Force Report 17
Table 1 (June 2008); Karel Lannoo, Concrete Steps Towards More Integrated Financial Oversight: The
EU's Policy Response to the Crisis, Centre For European Policy Studies Task Force Report 10-11
(Dec 2008).
David Ladipo and Stilpon Nestor, Bank Boards and the FinancialCrisis:A Corporate Governance Study
of the 25 Laeest European Banks 49 Exhibit 3.1 (Nestor Advisors 2009). Although these leverage
ratios are revealing, the existence of huge off-balance sheet exposures makes it difficult to form
judgments as to where the greatest degrees of leverage are to be found. Joseph Mason states that
off-balance sheet exposures were over fifteen times greater for US banks than on-balance-sheet
exposures. Joseph Mason, Off-Balance Sheet Accounting and Monetay Poliy Effectiveness, RGE Monitor
(Dec 17, 2008), online at http://www.rgemonitor.com/financemarkets-monitor/254797/offbalancesheetaccounting.and-monetary-policyineffectiveness (visited Nov 21, 2009).
See Ladipo and Nestor, Bank Boards and the FinancialCrisis at 54 Exhibit 3.7 (cited in note 16). This
is an example of why many commentators and experts thought that most large banks were well
capitalized until the subprime crisis led to a financial banking meltdown.
Elijah Brewer III, George G. Kaufman and Larry D. Wall, Bank CapitalRatios Across Countries: Why
Do They Vag?, Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper Series No 2008-28 (2008), online at
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leverage was compounded by the fact that more of the largest banks in the
world were to be found in Europe than in the US. Similarly, as discussed in
Section II.C.4, both German banks and US banks made use of off-balance-sheet
vehicles for their transactions in subprime mortgage securities. The combination
of the use, not just in the US but also in Germany and Europe as a whole, of
off-balance sheet vehicles and excessive leverage will be revisited at various
points in this paper. 9 Moreover, European banks have been far more exposed
to borrowers in the emerging market countries than US banks,2" a fact that
became important in the precipitate decline of many emerging market stock
markets and exchange rates in October 2008, particularly in Eastern European
countries that had been favorite lending and investment destinations for
European financial institutions.2'
In order to illustrate parallels in the subprime crisis across countries, I
begin in Section II by reviewing the structural and historical similarities between
various financial institutions, using German and US banks as examples. Section
1I further discusses the fragmentation problem as it exists in the US (because of
the many regulatory entities) and in Europe (because of separate regulation in
each country) and the concerns raised by the so-called "shadow banking
system." In Section III, I analyze the history behind the economic crisis and the
securitization process itself to explain why bank regulation is necessary. Section
IV further investigates the causes behind the regulatory failure, and Section V
makes some recommendations, identifying specific areas for improvement.

19

20

21

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264914 (visited Nov 21, 2009). Leverage also tended to grow steadily
after 2001; for the UK example, see GlobalFinandalStabii_*Report at 9 Chart 1.9 (cited in note 2).
Indeed, the notion that the subprime crisis was a purely US phenomenon may hide the fact that
the broader causes of the credit crisis of 2008 were much the same in Europe as in the US.
According to Arnoud Boot, a professor of finance and banking at the University of Amsterdam,
the "subprime loan crisis may have been the trigger ... but dangers like too much leverage, too
little oversight and an executive-bonus culture that encouraged risk-taking had been building for
years in Europe, just as in the United States." Nelson D. Schwartz, US Missteps Are Evident, But
EuropeIs Implicated,NY Times B1 (Oct 13, 2008).
The exposure of European banks to emerging markets is roughly ten times greater than the
exposure of US banks. Institute of International Finance, CapitalMarketsMonitor 7 Chart 3 (Nov
2008).
See David Oakley, Fitch Downgrades Four Emerging Markets, Fin Times (Nov 10, 2008), online at
(visited Nov 21,
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=fto11020081156511280
2009); David Oakley, Emeging Market Default Risk Grows, Fin Times (Nov 5, 2008), online at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7fba94ba-ab5f-1 ldd-b9el-000077b07658.html?ncickcheck=I
(visited Nov 21, 2009); Desmond Lachman, Europe Catches Pneumonia, Intl Econ Outlook No 2 at
4-5 (Nov 2008).
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II.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES

Finance in Europe remains, despite the efforts toward economic
integration, a national industry from the standpoint of most European economic
regulation, particularly bank supervision. As we shall see below, the role of the
individual states in the US has diminished steadily, especially in the last half
century. The EU has been more concerned with enabling banks from one
member state to penetrate lending and other financial markets in other member
states than it has been in bringing about an integrated system of EU-wide bank
supervision or even in creating uniform bank supervisory practices across the
EU. Thus, it is appropriate to look at a specific country when analyzing solutions
to the problems highlighted by the subprime crisis. Germany serves as an ideal
country for that purpose. Germany has the largcst financial markets in Europe,
next to the UK.22 Germany was more dramatically impacted by the subprime
crisis than other European countries. And Germany was historically a pioneer in
the development of real estate finance through the institution of the
Pfandbrief,23 the original example of a covered bond.

A. Banks in Germany
When one thinks of financial services in Germany, one immediately thinks
of the banks. In contrast, there have been, until recently, many large financial
firms in the US that are not banks in the sense that they do not take consumer
deposits. In the jargon of finance, they are not depository institutions. Goldman
Sachs has been a world-famous example.24
22

In one sense, the UK presents a special case in the EU because, like some other EU members

23

(but unlike Germany), it is not in the Eurozone and therefore its banks are not directly affected by
the European Central Bank, whereas the Eurozone national central banks, such as the German
Bundesbank, have ceded important monetary roles to the European Central Bank (although, as
we shall see, they may remain empowered in the area of bank supervision). In the particular case
of Germany, as discussed below, the German Bundesbank has lost its lead role in bank
supervision to a financial services authority-type institution that is responsible for securities,
insurance and banking regulation. See Section II.A.
See Section V.D (describing the Pfandbrief as a type of covered bond).

24

On September 21, 2008, Goldman Sachs announced that it would become a bank holding
company regulated by the Federal Reserve and would offer insured deposits (through a bank
subsidiary). It is striking that Goldman Sachs was already so large that it thereby immediately
became the fourth largest bank holding company in the US. See Goldman Sachs Press Release,
Goldman Sachs to Become the Fourth Largest Batik Holding Company (Sept 21, 2008), online at
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/press/press-releases/archived/2008/bank-holdingco.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). Goldman Sachs already had two bank subsidiaries, "Goldman
Sachs Bank USA and Goldman Sachs Bank Europe PLC-which, together, hold more than $20
billion in customer deposits." Id. On the same day, Morgan Stanley, another large investment
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Within Germany, the banking system involves three types of institutions:
commercial banks, savings banks (including the Landesbanken), and cooperative
banks.25 Only the commercial banks are privately owned in a strict sense. 26 The
fact that roughly half of bank deposits are not in truly private-sector institutions
comparable to US private-sector banks might suggest to an American observer
that privatization of publicly owned banks would greatly improve efficiency and
hence contribute to economic growth.2 7 But aside from the Postbank, there is
very little movement toward privatization for the sensible reason that most nonprivate banks, especially the local savings banks, give good and low-cost service
both to local depositors and to local borrowers.28 Still, the removal earlier in this
decade of the state guarantee from the Landesbanken (as a result of an EU
decision that the German guarantee was an unlawful state aid under the EU
treaty) was potentially a step toward partial privatization.2 9 In any event, there are
many fewer banks in Germany than in the US, even when adjusted for
population.
B. Banks in the United States
The history of banking in the US is exceedingly complicated. At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the US had a dual banking system, in which

25

26

27

28
29

bank, was granted permission to become a bank holding company. Today all of the large
investment banks have been transformed into bank holding companies or have been acquired or
have otherwise disappeared (with Lehman declaring bankruptcy).
Consider Allan Brunner, et al, Germany's Three-PillarBanking System (IMF 2004). See also id at 5
("Most cooperative banks concentrate (voluntarily) on their respective local markets and do not
compete with one another .... Cooperative banks are owned by their fifteen million members,
who are also their depositors"). They thus are not publicly owned, but also do not function like
competing private sector banks. On the three-pillar system, see Andreas Hackethal, German Banks
and Banking Structure, in Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, eds, The German FinancialSystem
71-101 (2004); Eric 0. Smith, The German Economy 319-44 (Roudedge 1994); Hans H. Bleuel, The
German Banking System and the Global Financial Cisis: Causes, Developments and Poliy Responses,
Dusseldorf Working Papers in Applied Management and Economics at 10-12 (2009), online at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1365813 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Savings banks (Sparkassen) are found in every Germany city and town, and most German citizens
hold deposits in these savings banks. Alina Carare, et al, Germany: Selected Issues, IMF Country
Report No 06/436, 76 n 70 (Dec 2006) ("Landesbanken are owned by the Lnder government(s),
Sparkassen (which are in turn owned by municipalities or their associations, and in some cases by
other public sector bodies).').
The special structure of German banking created difficulties for banking reform, especially for
reforms based on increased capital requirements because "co-operative and publicly-owned
banks.., are unlikely to be able to tap capital markets." James Wilson, German Bankers FearImpact
of New Rules, Fin Times 4 (Sept 21, 2009).
See Andy Mullineux and Eva Terberger, The Briish Banking System: A Good Role Modelfor Germany?,
Anglo-German Foundation Report 18 (June 2006).
Carare, et al, IMF Country Report No 06/436 at 77 129 (cited in note 26).
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both states and the national government could and did charter banks.3 0
However, each state could essentially decide what kind of banking structure it
wanted in its state, even with respect to nationally chartered banks. Many states
had quite restrictive branching rules. To take an extreme example, Illinois
permitted no branches whatsoever. Each Illinois bank could have only one
office. Eventually, through state and federal legislation, this preposterous
imitation of small town America gave way to economic reality. Today, thanks to
the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act,3' banks can merge and branch on a countrywide
basis. 2 This legislation put an end to most state protectionism in banking.3
Consequently, the number of banks in the highly decentralized US system
fell from over 14,000 to about 7,000 and continues to fall-though the increase
in the number of bank branches has assured that bank buildings appear far more
numerous than in the past.3 4 An interesting example of the change is that the
Bank of America, a historically renowned San Francisco bank now
headquartered in North Carolina, now employs more than 200,000 people as a
result of mergers over the last decade and has become the largest US bank.
Another major difference between Germany and the US is that "universal
banking"3 was not possible in the US until relatively recently. It is true that
universal banking was common in the US prior to 1933, but it was then
outlawed in the Glass-Steagall Act by Congress, which blamed universal banking
for the Great Depression. 36 As a result, two separate financial services industries
grew up: commercial banking for loans and investment banking for securities.
However, the US gradually returned more or less to universal banking through a

30

Consider Kenneth E. Scott, The PatchworkQuilt: State and FederalRoles in Bank Regulation, 32 Stan L
Rev 687 (1979-1980).

31

32

Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub L No 103-328, 108 Stat 2338
(1994), codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 USC (2006) (providing for US interstate
banking and branching).
Id, pmbl, 108 Stat at 2338.

33

The Riegle-Neal Act did permit states to impose certain narrow limitations on branching and
acquisitions. See William A. Lovett, Banking and Financial Institutions Law in a Nutshell 193-94
(Thompson West 6th ed 2005).

34

The number of US banks (state and nationally chartered) was once much larger, reaching over
31,000 in 1921, then dropping into the "teens" during the Great Depression of the 1930s and
then leveling off in the 14,000s during 1941 and for some decades thereafter. US Dept of
Commerce, HistoricalStatisics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2, Series 580-587
(1975).

35

"Universal Banking," as it is known in Germany, refers to a system where a bank can engage in all
kinds of lending and securities businesses.

36

See Glass-Steagall Act, Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (1933). See Peter J. Wallison, Deregulationand
the Financial Crisis: Another Urban Myth 3 (Oct 2009), online at http://www.aei.org/docLib/10FSO-October-g.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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series of interpretations that allowed commercial banks to do more and more in
the securities field and then through repeal of two provisions of the GlassSteagall Act in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999. 3" Today Citibank is an enterprise organized as a "bank holding company"
that owns not only a huge commercial bank subsidiary but also another
subsidiary that is one of the largest underwriters of securities in the US. And
though most large bank enterprises are in the securities business, they have to
separate their commercial banking business, which is entitled to accept deposits
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and thereby
enjoys what is often called "safety net" protection from their securities business.
The technique used is to create a bank holding company, which owns a
commercial bank subsidiary accepting insured deposits and one or more other
subsidiaries engaged in other businesses, such as a subsidiary that underwrites
and deals in securities.38 In the case of bank holding company insurance
activities, the insurance subsidiary would be regulated by the insurance
commissioner of the state where the insurance business is conducted.39 In fact,
insurance as an industry can in general only be regulated by the states under
existing law.4 °
C. Banking regulation
Although under the US dual banking system, state-chartered banks are
governed by state banking law, a state bank of any size will nevertheless be
regulated by a national regulatory agency. The details are of interest only to
banking lawyers, though they bear on an important characteristic-indeed, an
important weakness-of US banking regulation: namely, a multiplicity of
banking regulators and a resulting dispersion of authority. From a German and

37

38

39
40

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, § 101(a), Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999), codified at 12 USCS
§ 1811. This Act repealed the sections of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that had prohibited a
bank from being affiliated with firms that are primarily involved in underwriting or dealing in
securities. See Wallison, Deregulationand the FinancialCrisis at 3 (cited in note 36).
Wallison, Deregulation and the Financial Crisis at 3-4 (cited in note 36); Hal S. Scott, International
Finance: Transactions,Poliy, and Regulation 168-71 (Foundation 16th ed 2009). On the concept and
history of the safety net, see Charles W. Calomiris, The Postmodern Bank Safey Net 1-18 (AEI
1997), online at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040218_book192.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Robert H. Jerry, II and Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law § 13C[b] at 56
(LexisNexis 4th ed 2007).
See Richard S. Camel, Jonathan R. Macey, and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of Banking and
Financial Institutions 539-43 (Aspen 4th ed 2009) (reviewing the development of insurance
regulation in the US and noting that early case law precluded federal regulation for long periods in
US history). Furthermore, with quite limited exceptions, banks cannot be owned by non-financial
corporations (but that is true in Germany as well).
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EU point of view, this "fragmentation" of US regulation has serious
consequences for global financial governance. 41
1. Safety and Soundness Regulation
In the US the most important kind of regulation has to do with what
Americans call "safety and soundness." It is so called because it is designed to
prevent banks from taking excessive risks, thereby harming depositors and the
economy. A more internationally used term is capital adequacy regulation, and
today it covers much the same ground as the Basel I and Basel II agreements.
Banking regulation is often referred to by the term "banking supervision" to
stress the close relationship and working arrangements between individual banks
and their regulators. Some analysts make a distinction between regulation and
supervision of banks to stress the difference between rules of general
applicability and the discretionary roles of the regulating agency, particularly as it
deals with individual banks. 2 Indeed, in the US, the FDIC has the power to look
in great detail at the internal records of a bank and to close the bank if it fails to
take prompt corrective action to rectify certain regulatory violations.43
Today the federal government of the US has five bank regulatory agencies,
all performing similar functions, but with different kinds of banks:
1. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for nationally
chartered banks.
2. The Federal Reserve (Fed) for state-chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve system. The Fed also regulates "bank holding
companies," a category of financial institutions that played a role in the
crisis and in proposals for legislative change with respect to systemic
risk.

41

42

43

See Donato Masciandaro, Divide et Impera: Financial Supervision Unication and Central Market
FragmentationEffect, 23 Euro J Pol Econ 285, 295-307 (2007).
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Ben S. Bernanke
expressed the distinction this way in passing in a recent speech: "Let me turn from regulation (the
development of rules and standards that govern banks' practices) to supervision (ongoing
oversight and enforcement to ensure that the rules are being followed)." Ben Bernanke, Financial
Supervision after the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 54th
Economic Conference (Oct 23, 2009), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20091023a.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-242, 105 Stat 2236 (1991), codified at 12 USC
1811. See Lovett, Banking and FinancialInstitutions Law at 134-35 (cited in note 33) (discussing
FDIC guidelines for closing banks if they fall below "critical capital levels"). Consider George G.
Kaufman, Prompt Corrective Action in Banking: 10 Years Later, 14 Res in Fin Services (Elsevier
Science 2002); George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures,Systemic Risk and Bank Regulation, 16 Cato J 17
(1996) (describing prompt corrective action and related doctrines developed in the US in the
199 0s).
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The FDIC for state-chartered banks that are not members of the Fed
SytM44
system."
4. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) for so-called "thrifts," which
used to be called savings and loan associations. Thrifts correspond
more or less to German Sparkassen, though in the US they are now
privately owned. Not all thrifts, however, are small or local.
Washington Mutual, the largest thrift, was the fifth largest bank in the
country measured by deposits until it encountered problems in the
subprime crisis. After the FDIC intervened (under its safety net
powers) to put it in receivership, Washington Mutual was acquired by
JP Morgan Chase.45
5. The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for credit unions,
which are small local banks that usually service only employees of a
single employer or members of a union.
In addition, there are firms usually not thought of as banks that offer checking
accounts and money transfer services-for example, brokerage firms acting as
agents for the purchase and sale of securities for their customers-and their
regulation is entirely different. Then there are investment banks such as
Goldman Sachs, which for large business customers are much like a bank, but
are not usually thought of as a "bank" in the commercial banking sense of the
word because they do not take consumer deposits.46 To the extent that
brokerage firms and investment banks are subject to capital adequacy regulation
at all, it is normally through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) as overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
because of the firms' and banks' brokerage activities. But recent events,
3.

44

Beyond its regulatory role, the FDIC administers the deposit insurance system applicable to all
depository institutions, including those regulated by the other federal supervisory institutions.

45

See Robin Sidel, David Enrich, and Dan Fitzpatrick, WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to JP Morgan, in
Lagest Failurein US Banking History, Wall St J Al (Sept 26, 2008); FDIC, JPMorgan Chase Acquires
Banking
Operations
of
Washington
Mutual
(Sept
25,
2008),
online
at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO8085.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).

46

As discussed elsewhere in this Article, in the midst of the credit crisis, Goldman Sachs, in order to
become a bank holding company, acquired a commercial bank, which it operated as a subsidiary.
Still another kind of financial institution that is much like a bank but may be owned by
commercial firms is an industrial loan company. See US Department of the Treasury, The
Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a ModemiZed Financial Regulatory Structure ("Bush Treasury
Blueprint") 39 (Mar 2008). The September 2008 decision of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley,
the two largest non-depository investment banks, to become bank holding companies reduced the
number of such investment banks and sharply changed the face of US banking decisively in the
direction of universal banking.
For a discussion of SEC Rule 15c3 (Net Capital Rule), see Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, If
a Brokerage Firm Closes its Doors (FINRA
2009),
online
at
http://www.fmra.org/investors/protecryourself/investor alerts/p116996 (visited Nov 21, 2009)
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especially the 2008 "bailout" of Bear Stearns through actions of the Fed,48 have
raised questions on whether any financial entity that enjoys even tacit guarantees
from the US government should not be subject to some aspects of bank-like
regulation.49
In the home mortgage arena, there are a large number of firms that merely
originate mortgage loans, often selling them to other financial institutions. Many
of these mortgage companies are quite small, perhaps having only a single
storefront in a small town or suburb, even on a neighborhood shopping street in
a city. Their mortgage origination underwriting standards-sometimes rather
low to say the least-have played a role in the present crisis. Putting aside
questions of fraud by originators, which have figured prominently in the press,
there is littie doubt that underwriting standards declined greatly during the
subprime period. For example, between 2001 and 2006, the average loan to
value perccntage on home mortgages rose from 79.8 percent to 89.1 percent, the
share of mortgage loans that involved 100 percent financing rose from 3 percent
to 33 percent, the share of limited documentation loans (so-called "liars' loans")

(On SEC regulation of investment banks, see Chairman Cox Announces End of ConsolidatedSupervised
Entiies Program, SEC
Press
Release
2008-230
(Sept 26,
2008),
online
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009); Stephen Labaton,
SEC Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, NY Times Al (Sept 27, 2008); Cecilia Kang, Report
Says SEC Failedin Oversight of BearSteams, Wash Post D01 (Sept 27, 2008).
48

The Bear Stearns investment bank was "bailed out" in early 2008, largely on the ground that it
was too interconnected with counterparty financial firms to fail (rather than that it was too big to
fail). Since Bear Steams was not a depository bank, it was not subject to the normal FDIC process
for a failing bank. Itsbailout has raised the question of whether all financial institutions that
receive tacit safety-net protection should not be subject to regulation by analogy to depository
institutions that do receive explicit regulation and potential bailout protection from the FDIC.
Consider Peter J. Wallison, Bear Facts: The Flawed Case for Tighter Regulation of Securities Firms, AEI
Financial Services Outlook 3-6 (Apr 2008), online at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20080411_22974FSOApril-g.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). On the interconnectedness aspect and
other aspects of the basis for the Bear Steams bailout, see Caveat Counteqpary: Derivatives, The
Economist 86 (Mar 22, 2008); Jonathan Macey, Brave New Fed, Wall St J A19 (Mar 31, 2008). For a
more technical review of the sequence of events and the role of the Federal Reserve in providing
the financing for the bailout, see Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity
Pressures in Financial Markets, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 3, 2008) (testimony of Timothy F Geithner, President
and
CEO
of
Federal
Reserve
Bank
of
NY),
online
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/geiO80403.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
On the role of the SEC vis-a-vis the Federal Reserve, see Kara Scannell, SEC, Fed Stake Turf on
Oversight: Both Regulators Want to Expand Wall Street Role, Wall St J C3 (July 25, 2008).

49

For a discussion of various related issues, consider The Regulation of Investment Banking, Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No 263 (Sept 14, 2008). Even before the Bear Stearns
bailout, the US Treasury took the position that even financial institutions that did not accept
deposits should be subject to "macro-prudential ...market stability" regulation, and proposed the
Federal Reserve for that regulatory role. See Bush Treasury Blueprintat 146-58 (cited in note 46).
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rose from 27 percent to 44 percent.50 Yet non-bank mortgage companies are
even now essentially unregulated."
Another set of companies, usually referred to as "government-sponsored
enterprises" (GSEs), namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has played a huge
role in the home mortgage field. 2 In fact, well over half of all new securitized
mortgages were guaranteed by these GSEs."3 In addition, GSEs held large
volumes of home mortgages on their books for investment purposes. By March
2008, the GSEs had issued so much debt (counting guarantees) that their
outstanding debt was roughly equal to the publicly held debt of the US in its
governmental capacity.5 4 Especially relevant to the subprime crisis was the
extraordinary shift in 2005 of GSE activity away from traditional conventional
prime mortgages to a program of buying and guaranteeing subprime
mortgages."5 By 2007, some one-third of the GSE's business involved subprime
mortgages. 6 Moreover, between 2005 and 2007, the great majority of Freddie
Mac's mortgage activity involved mortgage loans that were quite different from
traditional mortgage loans of the early days of the GSEs: "90 percent were
interest-only mortgages [that is, no amortization of principal]; 72 percent were
negative amortization loans [that is, interest was not paid but rather added to
principal]; . . . and 58 percent had original loan-to-value ratios greater than 90

50

T2 Partners LLC, Why We Are Still in the Eary Innings of the Bursting of the Housing and Credit

51

Bubbles-and the Implicationsfor MBIA andAMBAC 4 (Mar 16, 2008). Indeed, the share of home
mortgage loans that involved both 100 percent financing and limited documentation rose during
the 2001-2006 period from 1 percent to 15 percent. Id at 4.
An issue that emerged after the subprime crisis evolved into the credit crisis was how the

52

mortgage origination process might be regulated.
On the GSEs prior to the subprime crisis, see W. Scott Frame and Lawrence J. White, Fussing and
Fuming over Fannie and Freddie:How Much Smoke, How Much Fire?, 19 J Econ Perspectives 159, 16061 (2005) (giving an overview of the history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).

53

In 2007 and early 2008 the GSEs guaranteed a much larger share of mortgage-backed securities
issuance (over 80 percent at times). See James B. Lockhart II, Lessons Learnedfrom Mortgage Market
Turmoil, Office of Federal Housing and Enterprise Oversight 44th Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition Chart 4 (May 16, 2008); An Open Letter to President-ElectObama,Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No 264, 2 (Dec 8, 2008) (noting with concern that
Freddie and Fannie hold half of the total amount of US subprime and Alt-A mortgage debt).

54

Lockhart, Lessons Learnedfrom Mortgage Market Turmoil at Chart 4 (cited in note 53).
See Charles Duhigg, Pressuredto Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, NY Times Al (Oct 5,
2008) (noting that this change came because Congress was pressuring Fannie Mae to help "steer
more loans to low-income borrowers" and lenders were threatening to sell directly to Wall Street
if Fannie didn't invest in riskier loans).
Peter J. Wallison and Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Ttilion-DollarCommitment: The Destruction of
Fannie Alae and Freddie Mae, AEI Financial Services Outlook 8 (Sept 2008), quoting Zachary A.
Goldfarb, Affordable-Housing Goals Scaled Back, Wash Post A 1 (Sept 24, 2008).
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percent.517 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "ended up holding more than half of
the AAA-rated subprime securitizations." 8
The GSEs operated as corporations with private shareholders, but they
long benefited from a number of special privileges that caused commentators to
refer to them as having "tacit" guarantees from the US government leading to
their ability to borrow at below commercial rates while lending at market rates.
Legislation in the summer of 2008 considerably strengthened the GSEs'
regulator and changed its name to the Federal Housing and Finance
Administration (FHFA). 9 Finally, in September 2008 the federal government
asserted direct control, through the FHFA, over the GSEs and effectively
mooted the question of how the GSEs fit into the Federal regulatory complex.
The big five bank regulators-the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, the OTS and
the NCUA-are so-called independent agencies. The OCC, for example, may be
in, or a part of, the Department of the Treasury, but that is a statement
essentially about real estate. By legislation, the Secretary of the Treasury has no
authority over the Comptroller's policies and decisions.6" Coordination among
these five bank regulators is normally at arms' length and is entirely voluntary.
What's wrong with this pluralistic and decentralized system, since
decentralization of power is normally thought to be a good thing? First, the
decentralization of regulation exists only because the statutory mandate of each
57

58

59

60

Wallison and Calomiris, The Last Trillion-DollarCommitment at 7 (cited in note 56). In addition, 57.5
percent involved so-called FICO scores at a level indicating that they were subprime loans. Id.
Joint Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees of Asia, Australia-New Zealand,
Europe, Japan, Latin America, and the US, Making SecuritiZation Work for Financial Stability and
Economic
Growth
(Aug
17,
2009),
online
at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/081709%/20Joint°/020Statement%20-/ 20Chile.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009).
On September 7, 2008, the Secretary of the Treasury announced that the FHFA was placing the
GSEs in "conservatorship," a step complemented by the purchase by the Treasury of preferred
stock in the GSEs and the creation of a special lending facility. See Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,
Statement by Heny M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Housing Finance Agenq Action to Protect Financial
Markets and Taxpayers, US Treasury Press Release
(Sept 7, 2008) online at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009); see also Questions and
Answers on Conservatorshp, Federal Housing Finance Agency (Sept 7, 2008), online at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa consrvfaq_090708hp1l28.pdf (visited Nov
21, 2009). The effect was to replace existing directors and top management and to subordinate
the rights of existing shareholders, while assuring holders of GSE debt that their rights would
remain valid.
Carnell, Macey, and Miller, The Law of Banking and FinancialInstitutions 61-62 (cited in note 40).
Similarly, the OCC does not have to clear legislative proposals through the Office of Management
and Budget, as would an agency that is clearly part of the Executive Branch. See id (observing that
the OCC does not have to turn to congressional appropriations for funding because it can fund
itself through fees from national banks); see also id at 61--64 (discussing generally the
independence of the OCC, Fed, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA).
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regulatory agency is different, the differences being mostly accidents of history.
Second, each bank can choose its own regulator to expand its business and/or
increase its profitability, just by switching from federal to state charter (or vice
versa), by becoming a member of the Fed or dropping Fed membership, or
through other relatively minor changes. This process, where the regulated party's
action changes which regulation applies, is often called "regulatory arbitrage."
Choice is often a good thing, and so may be "regulatory arbitrage." But the
motivations for regulatory arbitrage in bank regulation often have nothing to do
with safety and soundness or even with competition. Rather, the motivation is
achieving financial advantage by, for example, avoiding the fees by which the
OCC must fund itself,61 and hence regulatory arbitrage may not make a positive
contribution to regulatory policy. Safety and soundness regulation, with legions
of bank examiners pouring over bank accounting documents, is expensive. The
Fed and the FDIC, which have independent sources of funds, pick up the check
for their own regulation of state banks. For example, the Fed spends (just on
safety and soundness regulation alone) about one billion dollars a year of its own
money, which it makes essentially by creating money as part of its monetary
responsibilities. But the OCC, unlike the FDIC and the Fed, has no independent
way of generating money, so it has to charge its banks, the national banks,
assessments to help pay for the regulation.6 2 So the national banks had, at times,
a powerful financial incentive to switch their charters to state charters, just to
avoid the fee assessments. More recently, OCC regulation has become more
popular with banks because of the frequency with which courts have held that
national banking law preempts state laws with regard to certain operational
issues involving national banks.6"
Similarly, some banks have changed from being regulated by the OCC to
being regulated by the OTS. The objective of such banks appears to be to
lighten the constraints on the banks' operations. The OTS has a reputation for
being a more pliable regulator. In the case of IndyMac, a bank that failed in
2008, a report by the Treasury Inspector General indicates that an OTS official
bent the rules to allow IndyMac to appear better capitalized than would have

61

Id at 62.

62

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Frequenty Asked Questions about the Assessment Process,

63

online at http://www.occ.treas.gov/faqassessments.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
See, for example, Watters v Wachovia Bank, N-A, 550 US 1, 7 (2007) (holding that "Wachovia's
mortgage business ... is subject to OCC's superintendence, and not to licensing, reporting, and
visitorial regimes of the several States in which the subsidiary operates"). See Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2007, 21-22 (2007) ("[S]tate laws must
treat operating subsidiaries as if they were the national banks themselves.").
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been the case under a more literal application of the applicable rules.6 4
Countrywide Financial, a leading firm promoting subprime mortgages and which
later had to be saved by its acquisition by Bank of America, also switched to
OTS, again apparently in search of more lenient regulation.65
Bailey, Elmendorf and Litan have criticized the idea of merging these
regulatory agencies as changing boxes in a governmental organization chart
rather than changing what happens in each.66 That would be true if marrying
those five organizations together were merely a marriage of convenience. But
regulatory arbitrage is often a problem.67 It is worsened by the fact that each of
the five regulators has its own private sector constituency and in turn, its own
supporters within the legislative process, as vested private interests compete for
favorable legislation. Regulatory arbitrage is particularly unfortunate where the
jurisdiction of different regulators overlaps so that different regulatory agencies
can exert authority over hybrid products, as is the case for derivative products
subject to the jurisdiction of both the SEC and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC).68
Also, under the economic structure that has evolved in the last decade, a
conglomerate banking institution can lend to borrowers from its commercial

Under the OTS-approved approach, IndyMac was able to maintain its "well-capitalized" status
less than four months before it failed. See Eric M. Thorson, Letter to Senator Charles Grassly (Dec
22, 2008), online at http://onine.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IndyMac1 2-208EricThorsonsletter.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). See also Binyamin Appelbaum and Ellis
Nakashima, Banking RegulatorPlayed Advocate Over Enforcer, Wash Post A01 (Nov 23, 2008) ("In the
parade of regulators that missed signals or made decisions they came to regret on the road to the
current financial crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision stands out.").
65
Daniel Hemel, How to Hold Bank Regulators Accountable, Forbes.com (Dec 18, 2008), online at
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/18/sec-fdic-regulation-oped-cx dh_1218hemeLprint.html
(visited Nov 21, 2009) ("[I]n early 2007 Countrywide Financial Corp. re-chartered, ditched its old
regulator (the Comptroller) and switched to a new regulator (the notoriously-lenient OTS).")
66
Martin Neil Baily, Douglas W. Elmendorf and Robert E. Litan, The Great Credit SqueeZe: How it
Happened, How to PreventAnother, Econ Studies at Brookings Disc Paper at 9 (May 21, 2008), online
at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Fifles/rc/papers/2008/0516_credit-squeeze/0516-credit_
squeeze.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). The authors concede that they are "hardly enthusiastic about
the existing hodgepodge of regulation. Restructuring of responsibilities among regulatory agencies
would contribute to better oversight of the financial system." Id.
67
Regulatory arbitrage can, of course, discourage overregulation or the use by private institutions of
regulation as a means of price-fixing and exclusion of competition.
68 Peter J. Wallison concludes that, in the financial services field, regulatory jurisdiction overlap with
respect to hybrid products "will create great distractions for the regulators and chaotic regulatory
policies for the financial services industry. In addition, with regulators employing disparate
policies, the door will be open to regulatory arbitrage-that is, products will be designed to avoid
regulation." Peter J. Wallison, Thinking Ahead: Treasugy Preparesto Lay Down a Markerfor the Future
(PartI), AEI Financial Services Outlook 2 (Oct 2007).
64
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bank subsidiary, its investment banking subsidiary or its brokerage subsidiary.
The regulation can be different for each part of the conglomerate bank.
Moreover, these big complex conglomerate financial corporations engage not
just in lending but also in other activities such as investment banking, merchant
banking (including private equity), over-the-counter derivatives, asset
management, and brokerage just like any European universal bank. Although the
Fed has some statutory oversight responsibility over bank holding companies,
no single agency can regulate, or even understand, the whole enterprise. The fact
that a holding company may be required to create a subsidiary for a particular
field deals with only some of the risks. Certainly, a regulatory agency that can
deal with only one part of the enterprise cannot fully discharge its
responsibilities.
2. A Better Way to Regulate?
Isn't there a better way? The UK in 1997 moved to establish a single
financial regulatory agency, the Financial Services Authority (FSA).69 The
institution became a model for many other countries.7 ° In 2002, the
Bundesanstalt ffir Finanzdienstleistungsarbeit (BaFin) became the single
regulator for banking, securities and insurance in Germany. 7' The FSA model
contrasts with a "twin peaks" model of regulation, which organizes regulators by
the purpose of the regulation, placing prudential regulation in a different agency
from business conduct regulation. But both the FSA model and the "twin
peaks" model are paragons of simplicity compared with the complexity of the
US regulatory model.72
The FSA model provides a single regulator for banks and other deposittaking institutions. But perhaps even more important, the FSA model regulates
the issuance of securities (which is done by a separate agency in the US, the
SEC). The FSA model also regulates derivatives, which in the US is done by still
another agency, the CFTC, so named because it got its start regulating futures
69

Consider C.A.E. Goodhart, The OrganisationalStructure of Banking Supervision, Financial Stability Inst

70

Occasional Papers No 1 (Oct 25, 2000) (analyzing the benefits and drawbacks to the UK
regulatory scheme). For a history of the choice of a single regulator in the UK, see Eilis Ferran,
Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulatory Model, 57 Brooklyn
J of Intl L 257, 260-273 (2002-2003).
For a survey of various national organizational approaches to bank regulation, consider Financial

71

Services Institute, InstitutionalArrangements for Financial Sector Supervision: Results of the 2006 FSI
Survey, Financial Services Institute Occasional Paper No 7 (2007).
See Martin Schuler, Integrated Financial Supervision in Germany, Center for Euro Econ Research

72

Discussion Paper No 04-35 at 2 (2004).
For a comprehensive review of different models, consider Group of Thirty, The Structure of
Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace (Group of Thirty 2008)
(describing four approaches of regulation-institutional, functional, integrated, and twin peaks).
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contracts for agricultural commodities. In contrast to the UK, Germany, and
many other countries that have adopted the FSA model, the US (with its five
banking agencies, an SEC and a CFTC) has a dysfunctional regulatory structure.
The current crisis in the securitization of mortgages, since it involves both
banking and securities, has exposed to public attention the weaknesses of such a
fragmented structure.
In the US, banking regulatory agencies are not involved in the enforcement
of the securities laws, but the fact that securitization involves both loans and
securities suggests that it may be advantageous for the US to consolidate the
regulation of the two areas, following the example of the British FSA, the
German BaFin, and similar consolidated agencies in other countries. Since the
various US regulatory agencies are "independent" and not required to take
direction from the US Treasury, the Treasury has awakened to the fact that
when everyone is in control of some small piece of a problem, nobody is really
in control of the entire problem. The US Treasury announced in the autumn of
2007 that it would undertake a review of the US regulatory structure and, in the
words of a Treasury Undersecretary, the review would "take into account all
financial services industry participants including insurance, securities, and futures
firms, in addition to depository institutions, upon which most past Treasury
Department studies have focused., 73 That review was accelerated in view of the
worldwide financial crisis, and in March 2008, the Treasury released a 218-page
"Blueprint" for regulatory reorganization. 4
Despite the ambition of the Treasury Blueprint, there are historical
grounds for doubting whether such a consolidation will ever occur.75
President Clinton's first Secretary of the Treasury, Lloyd Bentsen, a former
Senator and hence supposedly an expert on legislative politics, tried to convince
President Clinton to endorse such a consolidation. But nobody listened.
President George W. Bush's first Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill, also
proposed such a consolidation, but the White House told him that it was
politically impossible. Even if a reorganization of the scope proposed in the
Bush Treasury Blueprint were eventually adopted, the Blueprint's release during
an election year made action unlikely until a new administration had time to
review the recommendations and both houses of Congress had time to hold
73

Robert K. Steel, Remarks before the American Enterprise Institute, US Department of the Treasury
Press Release (Nov 13, 2007), online at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp677.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009).

74

Consider Bush Treasury Blueprint (cited in note 46).

75

For suggestions as to how consolidation might best be undertaken, consider Howell E. Jackson,
A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the United States, Harv L
School Pub Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No 09-19 (2008), online at
http://ssrn.com/absrract=1300431 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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extensive hearings. Such hearings, in view of the extent to which powerful
interest groups could be expected to oppose certain aspects of the legislation
and to push their own complicating add-on proposals, would always be
contentious and lead to public controversy. 6
Change in US government organization rarely happens except in the wake
of a scandal (or other extraordinary circumstances), but the subprime crisisespecially with the follow-on credit crisis-certainly rises to that standard. Most
of the current bank regulatory agencies listed above were created because of
extraordinary circumstances. The OCC was created in the 1860s because of the
financial difficulties of subduing the South in the Civil War.7 The FDIC was
created at the time of widespread bank failures in the Great Depression. 8 And
one could add other historical events driving regulatory changes.
Even in the unlikely event that consolidation occurs, there are historical
reasons for doubting the quality of the results. For a recent example, the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 has hardly brought a major improvement in the
government's capacity to deal with terrorism in the US. The tough problem of
terrorism aside, a financial regulatory consolidation faces obstacles. The
regulatory agencies themselves include many people who will resist-for wellknown bureaucratic reasons.7 9 And the companies being regulated will find selfserving reasons for keeping the present decentralized system. Finally, members
of Congress seem far more interested in posturing as protectors of millions of
defaulting homeowners than in trying to work on more systemic financial system
problems.
Of course, reorganization does not guarantee improved results,8 ° and this is
particularly the case when the subject matter goes beyond regulation. For a
recent and highly relevant example, the British FSA, together with the British
76

For suggestions as to how a consolidation of banking regulatory agencies might be undertaken,
consider id.
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Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, online at http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The FirstFifty Years: A History of the FDIC 1933-1983, iii
(FDIC 1984), online at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/firstfifty/prologue.pdf (visited Nov
21, 2009).
For examples of conflict between the Treasury and the Administration, on the one hand, and the
financial regulatory agencies, on the other hand, with regard to regulatory reform, see Damian
Paletta and Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents at Regulators as Overhaul Stumbles, Wall St J (Aug 4,
2009), online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124934399007303077.html (visited Nov 21,
2009); Stephen Labaton, FDIC Chief CitiidZes Reform Plan, NY Times (Oct 30, 2009), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/business/30regulate.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
See Who Regulates the Regulators?: Northern Rock, The Economist (Mar 29, 2008), for a discussion of
the British FSA's failure to pay adequate attention to the Northern Rock matter.
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Treasury and the Bank of England, faced major problems in coordinating a
response among themselves in connection with the Northern Rock bank
collapse in the summer of 2007.81 In the end, Northern Rock had to be
nationalized. 82 More generally, the role of the central bank in regulating banks
vis-A-vis the role of an agency with more specific statutory responsibility for
bank regulation raises difficult and complex "fragmentation" questions in many
it performed
European countries." But even the FSA itself later admitted that
84
poorly in its own supervisory role with respect to Northern Rock.
In any event, there is little or no support in the US, even within the US
Treasury, for doing what the FSA model presupposes, namely, bring banking,
securities and insurance regulation into a single agency. 85 Certainly, the Treasury
in both the Bush and Obama administrations has assumed that each of these
three financial sectors would continue to be separately regulated. Under the
Bush administration Treasury Blueprint, the regulation of securities would have
been consolidated with the regulation of derivatives.8 6 And under the Blueprint,
insurance would have continued to be regulated separately by the fifty states,
though an optional national charter would be created, which many large
insurance companies would presumably choose to adopt if the national charter
would include significant preemption of state regulation.8 7 Furthermore, under
81

See Goodhart, The Background to the 2007 FinancialCrisis at 345 (cited in note 7). The disarray

82

among the three British bodies led to the publication of a Command Paper, FinancialStabili and
Depositor Protection: Strengthening the Framework, HM Treasury Command Paper 7308 (2008),
proposing a host of changes.
Lionel Laurent, Northern Rock Nalionalized, Forbes.com (Feb 17, 2008), online at

83

http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/1 7/northern-nationalize-bank-marketscx_11_0217northernrock.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). For a discussion of how a US FSA might
coordinate with the Federal Reserve in the case of larger financial institutions deemed to be
"systemically important," see CCMR, The GlobalFinancialCrisis:A Planfor Regulatory Reform at 207210 (cited in note 2).
Masciandaro, 23 Euro J Pol Econ at 295-307 (cited in note 41).

84

Financial Services Administration, FSA Moves to Enhance Supendsion in Wake of Northern Rock (Mar

85

26, 2008); Who Regulates the Regulators? (cited in note 80).
For a consideration of the differences, and the reasons therefore, between the US dispersed

86

regulatory structure and the UK organizational structure, consider Howell E. Jackson, An
American Perpective on the UK FinancialSerices Authoriy: Politics, Goals & Regulatog Intensity, Harv L
School Olin Discussion Paper No 522 (2005), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839284 (visited
Nov 21, 2009).
See Bush Treasugy Blueprint at 106 (cited in note 46) ("Treasury recommends a merger of the

87

Commodity Futures Trading Commission [which handles derivatives] and the Securities and
Exchange Commission [which handles securities].').
Id at 126-29. In June 2009 the US Treasury proposed (as part of the Obama Administration's
financial regulatory reform plan) the creation of an Office of National Insurance within the
Treasury Department and the development of a national "regulatory framework for insurance."
US Department of the Treasury, FinancialRegulatog7 Reform: A New Foundation, Rebuilding Finandal
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the Bush administration position, banking regulation would be consolidated in
one agency subject to a residual role for the Fed over bank holding companies.
The Obama Treasury has been even more modest. Its June 2009 proposal,
while decrying regulatory fragmentation, proposed simply consolidating the OTS
and the OCC,88 leaving federal regulation of state banks with the FDIC and the
Fed. Indeed, Scott has argued that the Obama Treasury proposal actually makes
fragmentation worse by creating four additional agencies to deal with the
financial meltdown that followed the subprime phase of the crisis and by "doing
away with federal preemption for national banks and failing to endorse the
optional federal charter proposal for insurance companies."' 9
The Treasury's modesty with regard to overall consolidation of financial
regulation reflects political reality in view of the long history of the US federal
structure. The Bush Treasury Blueprint did not eliminate state chartering of
banks, and it clearly contemplated some continued state consumer protection
legislation of banks. Yet insurance is a single industry today, unlike the situation
decades ago when there were many local insurance companies and insurance
cooperatives. So eventually, the absurdity of fifty states regulating companies
operating nationwide, indeed worldwide, may perhaps give way to reason. The
need for a federal bailout of American International Group (AIG), one of the
world's largest insurance enterprises, in which $85 billion was made available to

88

89

Supervision
("Obama
Treasury
Proposal")
39-41
(2009),
online
at
http://financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReportweb.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). Two of the
motivating factors were that the "United States is the only country in the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS-whose membership includes insurance regulators
and supervisors of over 190 jurisdictions that is not represented by a federal insurance regulatory
entity able to speak with one voice .. .)" and that "the European Union has recently passed
legislation that will require a foreign insurance company operating in its member states to be
subject to supervision in the company's home country comparable to the supervision required in
the EU." Id at 40.
Obama Treasury Proposal at 32 (cited in note 87) (proposing creation of the National Bank
Supervisor, which would "inherit the OCC's and OTS's authorities" while "the [Fed] and the
FDIC would maintain their respective roles in the supervision and regulation of state-chartered
banks").
Hal S. Scott, The GlobalFinancialCrisis 165 (Foundation 2009). However, Senator Dodd, Chairman
of the Senate Banking Committee, introduced legislation in early November 2009 that would
consolidate existing bank agencies (reducing the Federal Reserve's regulatory authority). Stephen
Labaton, Senate Plan Would Expand Regulation of Risky Lending, New York Times (Nov 10, 2009),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/11 regulate.html (visited Nov 21,
2009); Michael Crittenden and Jessica Holzer, Dodd Unveils Finandal-OverbaulMeasure, Wall St J
(Nov 10, 2009). The Dodd bill would thus reduce regulatory fragmentation, if it were to become
law. However, the Obama administration has sharply criticized the Dodd bill, albeit largely on the
ground that it would reduce the regulatory role of the Federal Reserve. Tom Braithwaite,
Government Offidals Rebuff Plan to Strip Fed's Bank Supenisoy Powers, Fin Times (London) 1 (Nov 14,
2009).
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AIG by the Fed in a revolving credit facility and the US Treasury took just under
80 percent of the shareholder voting power, raises serious questions about stateonly insurance regulation.9 ° That is particularly the case because the crisis leading
to the bailout was AIG's massive solvency-threatening issuance of credit default
swaps, a form of derivative that is not even insurance in the strict legal sense. 9'
In any event, fifty-state regulation means de facto regulation by the state of New
York, which is the site of the headquarters of many of the large insurance
companies. Only New York seems to have the capacity and the interest to do a
serious regulatory job.
3. European Fragmentation
I started my analysis by describing the fragmented US system of bank
regulation and the further fragmentation that arises from separate regulation of
banks, securities, and insurance. I contrasted the European unification of these
sectors in some, but by no means all, EU countries through consolidation under
FSAs.
However, the EU suffers from a different kind of fragmentation. The
regulation of new instruments like subprime securities and of securitization
generally is a question for the member states, and the European Central Bank
has little to say about regulatory, as opposed to monetary, issues. The European
Central Bank is a creature of the Eurozone, the area of the EU in which the
Euro is the currency. A substantial number of EU countries still use their own
national currencies, mainly in the newer eastern European members, but the
most important financial capital in the EU itself is London, which is not in the
Eurozone and therefore has the British pound as a home currency. The EU
rarely concerned itself with bank regulation except insofar as such regulation
might interfere with a major EU goal-the increase of cross-border banking as a
way of speeding the creation of a single European financial market.9 2 The EU
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92

See

AIG,

AIG

Nolice

(Sept

26,

2008),

online

at

http://ir.aigcorporate.com/

phoenix.zhtml?c= 76115&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1 202814&highlight= (visited Nov 21, 2009).
The Financial Times called the transactions a "de facto nationalization" of AIG. Francesco
Guerrera, et al, AIG's Complexity Blamedfor Fall,Fin Times 19 (Oct 7, 2008).
Actually, AIG was subject to some federal regulation by the OTS because it owned one savings
bank. The OTS was supposedly AIG's "consolidated supervisor" for its non-insurance activities,
but when the crisis hit it was the Treasury and the Federal Reserve that took charge because of
the systemic risk arising from AIG's credit default swap activity, which appears to have been
directed by a London-based office. See Guerrera, et al, AIG's Complexiy Blamedfor Fall at 19 (cited
in note 90).
Centre for European Policy Studies, Concrete Steps towards More Integrated FinancialOversight 17-21,
28-30 (Dec 1, 2008), online at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1585 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
For the history of a failed attempt to give the European Central Bank a mandate in financial
supervision, see id at 35-36. Consider Gerard Hertig, Ruben Lee and Joseph A. McCahery,
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had not, until very recently, been involved in financial stability issues. 93 In the
US, in contrast to the EU, there is some limited regulation of state banks by
state agencies, but all important and systemic issues concerning banking (as
opposed to insurance) are questions for federal regulators.
The issue of a Eurozone-wide single financial regulator surfaces from time
to time. An early French proposal for an EU-wide regulator was resoundingly
rejected. But the large bank losses stemming from the subprime crisis and the
failure of Northern Rock in the UK stimulated interest in supplementing the
European Central Bank monetary policy authority over the Eurozone with some
kind of corresponding competence in financial regulation. To achieve that end, it
was necessary to use the EU, in view of the lack of competence of the European
Central Bank to exercise jurisdiction outside the Eurozone.
A report to the European authorities in Brussels by Jacques de Larosilre,
94
chair of an EU High Level Group, helped galvanize attention toward the cause.
The EU Commission subsequently built on an existing set of EU "third level"
coordinating committees 9 in the member states to create a program for
enhancing and harmonizing EU member state banking regulation. The
Commission created a structure for doing so, but it remains to be seen whether
this structure will be effective enough to overcome European fragmentation.
4. The Shadow Banking System
The Treasury Blueprint's proposal to merge banking regulators obscured
part of the complex reality that came into view during the subprime crisis and
the ensuing credit crisis. First, not all of the institutions that lend or otherwise
provide capital are banks. The additional non-depositary institutions, which

93

94

95

Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach, European Corporate Governance
Institute Finance Working Paper No 262/2009 (Aug 2009), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1327824 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
For proposals as to how the EU might proceed, consider Deutsche Bank Research, Towards a New
Structure for EU Financial Supervision (Aug 22, 2007), online at http://www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBRINTERNETDE-PROD/PRODOOOOOO0000214976.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Even the new interest is primarily directed at the relative competence of home and host
governments and the allocation of responsibilities with regard to bank insolvency.
De Larosi~re Group, Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Feb
25, 2009), online at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/fmances/docs/de-larosiere-reporten.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
On the third-level coordinating committees, see id,
190-214; European Commission, Financial
Services Supervision and Committee Architecture, online at http://ec.europa.eu/
internalmarket/finances/committees/index en.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009). See also Financial
Services: Commission Adopts Additional Legislative Proposals to Strengthen Financial
Supervision in Europe (EU Commission Press Release, October 26, 2009), online at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=P/09/1582&format=HTML&aged
=0 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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journalists sometimes collectively call the "shadow banking system, 96 include
broker-dealers, hedge funds and private equity firms. None of them was
regulated as a bank, though in 2008 most remaining large broker-dealers that
engaged in investment banking activities chose to become bank holding
companies regulated under the Fed in order to be able to qualify for financial
assistance on much the same basis as commercial banks. In addition, the
"shadow banking system" included unregulated legal entities created as part of
the securitization process, notably structured investment vehicles (SIVs). SIV
assets were frequently absorbed back into the banking system by sponsoring
banks because of the reputation risk to those banks of not standing behind those
vehicles. Far from being a mere tail on the formal banking system, these "offbalance sheet vehicles" were a huge proportion of the overall financial system.
"By 2007 the New York Fed calculated that the combined assets of all the SIVs
and similar vehicles came to $2.2 trillion, while hedge funds controlled another
$1.8 trillion, and the five [largest investment banks] had $4 trillion on their
97
balance sheets ... [whereas] banks as a whole had $10 trillion in assets.,
At the other end of the subprime mortgage securities assembly line were
the mortgage brokers that played a crucial role in creating the subprime crisis by
selling mortgage loans to home borrowers who could not qualify for prime
borrower status. In many cases, these borrowers did not have sufficient income
to make their mortgage payments, even at the time they borrowed and certainly
not later as the economy softened. As time has passed, the view has gradually
become more dominant that mortgage lending practices were most at fault for
producing the subprime mortgage crisis and therefore most in need of some
kind of regulation, albeit not necessarily by banking regulators. Thus, even
though the Treasury Blueprint was regarded by many observers as impossibly
ambitious at the time of its release in early 2007, it can be seen as perhaps not
ambitious enough to deal with the subprime crisis and the ensuing credit crisis,
particularly at the initial lender-borrower end of the securitization chain where
the initial individual mortgage loan transaction occurs. These transactions,
especially for subprime loans, are largely unregulated and too often characterized
96

97

See Gillian Tett and Paul J. Davies, Out of the Shadow: How Banking's Secret System Broke Down, Fin
Times (Dec 16, 2007), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/42827c50-abfd-lldc-82fO0000779fd2ac.html (visited Nov 21, 2009); Alistair Barr, Big Brokers Threatened by Crackdown on
Shadow Banking System, MarketWatch (June 20, 2008), online at http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/big-brokers-threatened-by-crackdown-on-shadow-banking-system (visited Nov 21, 2009);
Nouriel Roubini, The Shadow Banking System Is Unravelling, Fin Times 9 (Sept 22, 2008).
Gillian Tett, Fool's Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan Was Cormpted by Wall
Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe 225 (Free Press 2009). See Timothy F. Geithner, Reducing
Systemic Risk in a Dynamic FinancialSystem, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (June 9,
2008). online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/tfgO80609.html
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
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by borrower ignorance and lender deception as to terms and conditions. It is for
this reason that the Obama administration proposed the creation of a Consumer
Financial Protection Agency (CFPA).98 The CFPA proposal has been harshly
criticized, to take the language of one critic, as reflecting "elitist protection
concerns that consumers don't need."99 But the proposal has also been
supported in principle on the straightforward ground that these local
transactions can be made fairer and more efficient for the national economy if
better and simpler information for consumers is mandated as part of each
0
transaction."'

III. THE ROLE AND CHALLENGES OF REGULATION: WHY
REGULATE BANKS AT ALL?
One of the fears raised by the fierce public reaction to the present
international financial crisis is that any new regulation introduced will do more
harm than good. In order to assess proposals for change, it is therefore useful to
consider the reasons that have led all countries to regulate banks. The regulation
of banks has many objectives. Aside from concerns about fraud and consumer
protection, the principal justification for regulation of the banking sector
involves the confluence of a few main factors.
First, a healthy financial sector is crucial to the stability and growth of the
entire economy of a country.
Second, the banking part of the financial sector is peculiarly prone to
crises. 01' Every decade the banking sector experiences a crisis in one or more
major countries. In the past quarter century we have seen the savings and loan
crisis in the US, the Asian financial crisis, and the long-lasting Japanese non98

US Treasury, Financial Regulatoy Reform at 55 (cited in note 87). The Treasury proposal would
exempt "investment products and services already regulated by the SEC or the CFTC." Id at 5556.

Peter J. Wallison, Eliist Protection That Consumers Don't Need, Wash Post (July 13, 2009), online at
http://www.washingtonpost.cum/wp-dyn/content/arricle/2009/07/12/AR2009071201663.html
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
100 See, for example, Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, A New Consumer Financial Protection
Ageng, Statement No 278 at 2 (Sept 14, 2009), online at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
Statement%20No%20278.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
101 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff have counted five big and a much larger number of
smaller "bank-centered financial crises" since 1945. See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S.
Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime FinancialCrisis so Different? An InternationalHistoricalComparison,
NBER Working Paper 13761 at 4-5 (2008), online at http:www.nber.org/papers/w13761 (visited
Nov 21, 2009). On banking crises, consider Carmin M. Reihart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time
is Different (Princeton 2009). For an analytical approach to the persistence of crises, consider
Charles Calomiris, Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game, NBER Working Paper No 15403 (Oct
2009), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15403 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
99
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performing loan problem, as well as severe country-specific crises in Sweden
(1991), Finland (1991), and Norway (1987) and lesser financial crises in Australia
(1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), Italy
(1990), New Zealand (1987), and the UK (1991)."2 By 2009, the world's
financial headlines were filled with the worldwide ramifications of the subprime
mortgage crisis, which had rapidly turned into a worldwide financial crisis
because so many financial institutions in so many countries had invested in
securities that were simply packages of US subprime home mortgage loans.
A third factor, having to do with the operations of banks, is that banks are
thinly capitalized compared to other kinds of corporations. Specifically, banks
are particularly highly leveraged compared to many types of financial
institutions, although normally less so than many hedge funds. °3
Fourth, banking profitability tends to depend on borrowing short and
lending long. Clearly, this strategy enhances profitability, since in normal times
the interest rate curve slopes upward, with short-term rates being lower than
long-term rates. But sometimes the curve is flat or even inverted, and then banks
face financial difficulties. In economic downturns, the default rate of bank
as riskier,
borrowers rises. As a result, lending banks, as they become0 perceived
4
borrowing.'
short-term
their
in
costs
may face rising funding
This fourth factor goes to the heart of the special economic nature of
banking. Thin capitalization and a "borrow-short, lend-long strategy," seem
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103
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Reinhart and Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime FinancialCrisis so Different? at 4-5 (cited in note
101). Crises limited to one bank (a 1994 crisis in France and a 1995 crisis in the UK) have been
omitted from the Reinhart-Rogoff list. More recently, in 2008, Iceland once again plunged into a
severe financial crisis. See David Ibison, Iceland's Rescue Package Flounders, Fin Times 8 (Nov 12,
2008).
A characteristic witticism runs, "What is the difference between banks and hedge funds?"
Answer: "Banks are more highly leveraged." David Wessel, Magniying the Credit Fallout,Wall St J
A2 (Mar 6, 2008) (noting that banks are so highly leveraged that for every $1 they lose in capital,
they will lend out $10 less). The witticism may not be literally correct for the US. For example,
one prominent hedge fund, Carlyle Capital, maintained leverage of over thirty to one. Tom
Bawden, Stunning Collapse of Bond FundLeaves Carlyle Down, Not Out, Times OnLine (Mar 8, 2008),
online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/money/funds/article3508170.ece (visited Nov 21,
2009).
Not only do banks have a mismatch in maturities between their assets and their liabilities, but
their assets tend to be illiquid compared with their liabilities. See Nouriel Roubini, Ten Fundamental
Issues in Reforming FinancialRegulation and Supervision in a World of FinancialInnovation and Globalizaion,
RGE Monitor (Mar 31, 2008), online at http://media.rgemonitor.com/papers/0/NourielRegulationSupervisionMarch08.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). That is, borrowers from banks do not
have to repay until the due date, but banks cannot count on always being able to roll over their
short-term borrowings funding those loans, as the experience of bank-sponsored SIVs showed.
See discussion in text above.
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necessary for a bank's profitability,1"5 or at least it was necessary when banks
depended on interest payments on their loan portfolio, as opposed to fee
income for various financial services. In order to assure that banks did not
become insolvent and hence default on their obligations to their depositors,
capital adequacy became a principal form of bank regulation. Capital had to be
adequate to assure that a bank could pay off its creditors-principally its
consumer depositors-at all times. And since government deposit insurance
often involves a separate fund (such as that maintained in the US by the FDIC),
regulators have a special, separate incentive to protect that fund through capital
adequacy requirements.
A further purpose of bank regulation-and the main focus of this
Article-is to prevent financial instability. By financial instability, I mean the
collapse or weakness of one bank leading to the collapse or weakness of other
banks-in short, systemic failure of the banking system. From the standpoint of
the world economy, the purpose of international agreement on capital adequacy
regulation is not so much to protect the creditors of a particular bank or to
protect the banking system of any particular country but to prevent a bank
failure from leading to failures of many banks and hence to financial instability
across countries. Various popular terms are used to describe the instability
problem that capital adequacy regulation addresses. Americans talk about the
domino effect. The British call it "knock-on" effects. Whatever one calls it, a
normal goal of bank regulators is to reduce these collective effects. This
regulatory goal is often called the objective offinanialstabiliy.
A. The Subprime Issue in Europe
The subprime crisis led to severe effects in a number of countries. A
leading illustration involves effects on banks in Germany. The spread of the
subprime mortgage problem from the US to Germany is a good illustration of
the domino effect in which financial instability can spread not just from one
bank to another but from one country to another.

105

In addition to these risks, Phillip R. Wood mentions a number of other factors that cause banks
to be risky. Philip R. Wood, Regulation of InternalionalFinance 1-015-1-019 (Sweet & Maxwell 2007).
One of these factors is that regulators are (or should be) particularly conscious that what
differentiates banking from nearly all other industries is that there "is a higher degree of
interconnectiveness between banks and other participants in financial markets, so that a default of
one can compact like dominoes on the others. Thus banks are linked in payment systems and in
interbank deposit markets where they borrow heavily from each other over the short term." Id at
1-017. This interconnectiveness is often referred to as "counterparty risk," since one bank may
have a credit balance with another bank (the counterparty), or have a credit default swap
agreement with that counterparty, and if the counterparty becomes insolvent, the first bank may
experience a loss.
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Though the problem originated in the US, the resulting weakness and even
failure in Germany of several Landesbanken (masked, to be sure, in part by
forced mergers of Landesbanken), °6 the quadruple bailout of IKB (a leading
lender to mid-sized, or "Mittelstand" industry),0 7 and the big losses of private
sector banks-even Deutsche Bank, which initially appeared to have avoided the
captured public attention. These
exposure to subprime mortgages' 8-have
events illustrate that in the present globalized financial world, worldwide
financial stability must be a cooperative effort by national regulatory bodies,
involving both buyers and sellers of securitized products. German banks bought
the subprime mortgage securities apparently without knowing, or perhaps
without caring, exactly what they were buying." 9 They did so because the
prospective returns were relatively high compared with their other investment
opportunities.
The Sachsen Landesbank, which later had to be merged with another
Landesbank, went so far as to create a special unit in Dublin to carry out trading
in subprime mortgage securities." 0 Moreover, it is useful, in considering
recommendations concerning off-balance sheet entities such as SIVs and
conduits, to consider that such entities have been used by investing banks, and
not just by originating and securitizing banks. As C.A.E. Goodhart has pointed
out:
German landesbanken, IKB and Sachsen . . . had conduits .

.

. [that] were

many times the size of their own available capital stock. With the decline of
the value of assets in their conduits, in effect these landesbanken were
106

107
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See Hugh Williamson, Saxony PremierResigns after Subprime Losses, Fin Times (Apr 14, 2008), online
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/756fa926-0a17-1ldd-bSbl-0000779fd2ac.html (visited Nov 21,
2009); James Wilson, Put Logic Before Size, Uges Landesbank, Fin Times 18 (Aug 4, 2008).
James Wilson and Andrew Bounds, Commission to Investigate Bail-Outs of German Banks, Fin Times 2
(Feb 28, 2008). In a final ironic twist, the IKB, which had been portrayed as a victim of the US
subprime crisis, was finally sold by a German firm (KfW), which held a majority interest in 1KB,
to a US private equity firm, Lone Star. See Carter Dougherty, Lone Star Buys 1KB at a Major
Discount,Intl Herald Trib 11 (Aug 22, 2008).
James Wilson, Deutsche Bank Profits Hit by €2.3bn Writedown, Fin Times 22 (Aug 1, 2008).

109

Ottmar Issing, a well-known German central banker, has stated that "[iun Germany... the most
affected banks obviously had no understanding of the assets they had on their balance sheets."
Ottmar Issing, A TIE Exclusive Intervew with OtmarIssing, 22 Intl Economy 49 (Summer 2008). For
a description of IKB's willingness to buy offerings of US subprime mortgage securitized offerings
"on a regular basis", see Peter Gumbel, Subprime on the Rhine, 156-5 Fortune 71 (Sept 3, 2007).

110

Readers with an interest in the role of the Landesbanken, which have had about 20 percent of the
total banking assets in the German banking system, should consult Carare, et al, IMF Country
Report No 06/436 at 76-97 (cited in note 26). The IMF report is unremittingly critical of the
Landesbanken, stating for example, "[alrguments for public ownership of the LBs are hard to
come by . . . . At the same time, they create potential for distortions, including those from
(admittedly waning) arbitrage opportunities, and from conflicting roles of the government as
owner and supervisor .... It is unclear what market failure LBs attempt to remedy." Id at 76-78.
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suffering a severe reduction in their own capital, and they had to
be... bail[ed out] by their respective regional governments."'
In fact, the Sachsen Landesbank had conduits with assets equal to 30 percent of
its total assets and hence, as a typically leveraged bank, many times its capital.'12
Similarly, IKB's "conduit- and SIV-financed assets" were equal to nearly five
times their equity and over 20 percent of their on-balance sheet assets, and
hence when they could no longer roll over the short-term financing of those offbalance sheet items in the commercial paper market, 1KB had to meet its
"contractual obligation" to finance these assets, much of which were presumably
subprime mortgage-backed securities. "[B]y March 2008, the estimated rescue
costs mounted to almost C8 billion, exceeding the bank's equity about
fivefold.""'

Moreover, in the case of IKB, it was not American banks or their offbalance sheet vehicles that sold subprime securities to IKB, but rather Deutsche
Bank, Germany's largest privately owned bank." 4 IKB bought the subprime
securities through its own special purpose vehicle, Rhineland Funding, which
was able to fund itself in short-term money markets in part thanks to credit
guarantees provided by Deutsche Bank." 5 Although Rhineland Funding was
IKB's special purpose vehicle, Deutsche Bank provided the administrative
services for Rhineland Funding, including acting as custodian and trustee." 6 This
German example illustrates the more general phenomenon that at least some
European banks seized the opportunity to sell subprime securities backed by US
mortgage loans and that European financial institutions used SIVs and conduits
in much the same manner as American financial institutions. Thus, it would be
wrong to assume that regulatory reform is primarily about changes required in
"1

112

Goodhart, The Background to the 2007 FinancialCrisis at 343 (cited in note 7).
Nicholas Veron, No Hope in a Storm: Why Europe is Unpreparedfor the Next Banking Crisis, 22 Ind
Economy 53, 54 (Summer 2008) (noting that this high percentage technically still complied with
capital adequacy requirements). German Landesbanken set up "off-balance sheet 'conduits' and
grant[ed] them overly generous credit lines-of which Sachsen LB's C1 7.3bn was the largest." See
Ivar Simensen and Ralph Atkins, Not Uncriical'Subprime Exposure Drags Down German Banks, Fin
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Times 9 (Aug 22, 2007).
Jurgen Odenius, Germany: Poliy Lessonsfrom FinancialMarket Turbulence, IMF Survey Magazine 77-
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78
(2008),
online
at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/
CAR042308A.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
See German Government Won't Sue Deutsche Bank over IKB, Reuters (Mar 11, 2008), online at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL1 188043420080311 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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Id.
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Id. Well over half of IKB's operating profit came from "structured finance" and "securitization."
For more such detail on IKB, Rhineland Funding, Deutsche Bank and subprime mortgages,
consider Carrick Mollenkamp, Edward Taylor, and Ian McDonald, GlobalScale: Impact of Mortgage
Crisis Spreads-HowSubprime Mess Ensnared German Bank: IKB Gets a Bailout,Wall St J Al (Aug 10,
2007).
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US law or that these changes would affect operations of only US banks. The use
of off-balance sheet entities should be regarded not just as a securitization
problem, but a worldwide banking regulation issue.
Subprime problems in Europe arose heavily from the purchase of USorigin securitized mortgage loan products, but a substantial proportion of
European problems arose from the use by German banks of the same originateto-distribute securitization as practiced in the US. Although Germany largely
escaped these kinds of problems by use of covered bonds, as described above,
the UK, Spain and the Netherlands suffered substantially from the sale of
securitized mortgage products."' According to a European Central Bank study,
securitization was little used in Europe prior to the adoption of the euro as the
common currency of the Eurozone, but thereafter there was a "spectacular
increase in securitisation activity in the euro area. '""' Nevertheless,
though
securitization has been used in Germany for German residential real estate
financing, the specific types of problems plaguing the US with regard to
subprime mortgages apparently have not arisen in the case of German real estate
because of the special type of securitization utilized-the Pfandbrief, referred to
in the United States as a covered bond." 9
B. The Securitization Process And the Subprime Crisis
Let us look in greater detail at what these securitized transactions were.
Once upon a time, banks lent money to homebuyers, and the banks took
mortgages as collateral for the loans. The banks then held these mortgagebacked loans to maturity, making their profit on the interest payments.
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John Kiff, Paul Mills, and Carolyne Spackman, European Securitsation and the Possible Revival of
Financial Innovation, VoxEU
(Oct 28,
2008),
online
at
http://www.voxeu.org/
index.php?q=node/2494 (visited Nov 21, 2009). See ESF Securitisation Data Report 3 (2003),
online at http://www.securidzaion.net/pdf/esfreport_082903.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009)
(reporting country-by-country data of European securitization). With regard to the UK, see Turner
Review at 15-17 (cited in note 13). On the adoption in much of Europe of the "originate to
distribute" model, see Deutsche Bank Research, EuropeanBanks: The Silent (R)evolution 24 (April 22,
2008), online at http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBRjINTERNETEN-PROD/PROD
0000000000224371.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Yener Alunbas, Leonardo Gambacorta, and David Marques, Securitisation and the Bank Lending
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Channel, European Central Bank Working Paper Series No 838 at 7 (Dec.2007), online at
http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp838.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Louis Hagen, A Safe Haven From the Subprime Crisis, Atlantic Times (Jan 2008), online at
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www.adantic-times.com/archive-detail.php?recordlD=1148 (visited Nov 21, 2009); Verband
Deuscher
Pfandbriefbanken, The Pfandbrief-A Premium Product (2002), online at
http://www.pfandbrief.org/d/internet.nsf//346DAA456C29D9AC125741F00254245/$FILE
/PfandbriefPremiumProduct.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). Consider Verband Deutscher
Pfandbriefbanken,
Annual Report (2008),
http://www.pfandbrief.de/d/bcenter.nsf/O/
99A93B50A14C60E2C12575B70046D779/$FILE/EN..vdp-JB2008.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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Today US banks find that method of operation too old-fashioned. What
they want is fee income, and they want it up front rather than spread over many
years. By fees, I simply mean charges of any kind as opposed to interest income.
In lending with houses as security, US banks often make (or buy) a large number
of such mortgage loans, and then package them together in securities, using the
underlying packaged mortgages as collateral for these securities. The securities
are appropriately called mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).' 20 The process of
securitization results in the bank being able to charge a fee for securitization (or
sell the securities for more than the amount of the underlying principal of the
mortgage loans), and thus translate long-term interest income into immediate
income. Thus, income is accelerated and, more importantly, no reserves need be
held under capital adequacy regulation, including Basel ."2 Even the newer
Basel II does not automatically lead to higher required bank reserves.122
Although it would be too simple to say that Basel I led to securitization, there is
little doubt that Basel I made securitization more attractive. Securitization helped
to avoid Basel I capital adequacy requirements, most simply because as soon as
assets are securitized, no assets remain on the balance sheet of the originating
banks. 123 According to one assessment, "securitization has rendered the 1988
[Basel] Accord's minimum capital requirements ineffective as a tool to maintain
' 1 24
adequate regulatory capital against the real risk taken.
120

A more general term is asset-backed securities ("ABS'). In the original language of securiization,
MBS was a subset of ABS but today the terms are typically used to describe two kinds of assetbacked securities. ABS is discussed below in the special context where MBS securities are
themselves used as collateral for asset-backed commercial paper.
121 A further weakness of the Basel agreement, unrelated to securitization, is that it treated real estate
mortgage loans as only half as risky as other loans to nongovernmental borrowers and, though
this was the result of an essentially political decision (analogous to many other US government
policies favoring home loans), experience in the subprime crisis demonstrates that many types of
home loans were especially risky).
122 See Ayadi, Basel 1 Implementation at 23-27, 49-61 (cited in note 15) See Barry Eichengreen, Ten
Questions About the Subprime Crisis, Banque de Fr, Financial Stability Rev Special Issue on Liquidity
No 11, 21 (Feb 2008) ("Under Basel II, regulators will take into account the riskiness of a bank's
overall portfolio . . . when establishing capital requirements."); Scott, International Finance:
Transactions, Poliy, and Regulation 592-94 (describing the operational requirements for transferring
assets from the originating bank's books, which permits originating banks not to hold capital
against such assets) (cited in note 38). Pillar II of Basel II enables national regulators to exercise
discretion when requiring higher capital in the case of securitization. See id at 375.
123 This discussion ignores possible legal complications under Basel I coming from liquidity facilities

124

involving a promise to provide funding to special purpose vehicles-S1Vs and conduits-that
became unable to fund themselves in the short-term money markets. See Would Basel II Have
Heoed Prevent the Subptime Turmoil, Statement of the Shadow Regulatory Committee No 253 (Dec
10, 2007) (pointing out that Basel 11 imposes a capital charge on short-term lines of credit to SIVs
sponsored by a bank).
Ayadi, Basel1I Implementation at 19 (cited in note 15).
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This new strategy of banks, particularly US banks, is known as the
"originate to distribute" model, as distinguished from the old-fashioned
"originate to hold" model. The term "subprime" has been defined in various
ways, but in its broader meaning with regard to mortgages it refers to mortgages
of less than investment grade.
When one turns to securitization, however, the use of tranches creates a
new framework for the usage of the term "subprime." The securities are sold in
tranches. The highest tranche is normally rated AAA, the highest rating, but
lower tranches have lesser and lesser ratings, let us say AA, A, BBB, and so on
with some of such letter ratings being defined as prime and lower ones as
subprime. The rating received by individual tranches has little and sometimes
nothing to do with the quality and safety of the mortgages underlying the
issuance as a whole. It is important to note that there is just one pool backing
the issuance as a whole rather than a separate pool for each tranche. Indeed,
through the alchemy of securitization, a tranche of securities may be rated AAA
even though none of the underlying mortgage loans are of prime grade. 2 How
is this possible?
The AAA-outcome depends on the concept of credit enhancement. In
addition to guarantees from monoline insurers,"' a principal way of achieving
this enhancement is to use the loans in lower tranches as security. 127 This is
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For a description of the use of tranches to achieve desired ratings, see Efraim Benmelech and
Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings, NBER Working Paper No w14878 at 21
(April 2009); Adam B. Ashcraft and Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securiti ation of Subp ime
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Mortgage Credit, 2 Found & Trends Fin 191-309 (2008). The alchemy of securitization, in which
the use of tranches and associated mechanisms (as described below) leads to purchases of
securitized products that are not based on an examination by either buyers or, in many cases, by
credit rating agencies of the underlying individual mortgage loans. Thus far, US government and
international organization reform proposals do not require disclosure of detailed loan level data.
However, requiring disclosure of such loan level data warrants consideration. See CCMR, The
Global FinancialCrisis:A Planfor Regulatogy Reform at 143-145 (cited in note 2). Although there may
have been little demand for such disclosure during the pre-crisis boom, it is difficult to see how
mortgage loan securitization can regain its former position in real estate finance without such
disclosure and a willingness of the buy side to analyze such data as part of due diligence.
A monoline insurer is an insurer that has only one line of insurance (in this case, the monoline
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insurers only guarantee securities). According to the Association of Financial Guaranty Insurers
("AFGI"), the advantage to specializing in one line of insurance is that the insurer can build
expertise in detecting problems specifically in their field. See AFGI, Advantages of the Monoine
Structure, online at http://www.afgi.org/monoline.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009). Yet the monoline
insurance companies suffered greatly from their insurance of subprime securities. See Baily,
Elmendorf and Litan, The Great Credit SqueeZe at 34-35 (cited in note 66).
"A central insight of structured finance is that by using a larger number of securities in the
underlying pool, a progressively larger fraction of the issued tranches can end up with higher
credit ratings than the average rating of the underlying pool of assets." Joshua D. Coval, Jakub
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possible through application of the "waterfall" principle. All of the interest
receipts for all 6f the tranches are collected, and then are transferred to the
highest tranche investors first to the extent needed to satisfy their contractual
claims to principal and interest. Only when all of the highest tranche investors
are paid is any of the interest income received on behalf of the next highest
tranche. This procedure is then followed on down the tranches-hence, the
analogy to waterfalls.' 28 The middle tranches are commonly called "mezzanine
tranches" and the lowest tranches "equity tranches," the latter by analogy to
equity investors who receive dividends only when all creditors' claims are
satisfied.'29
Beyond the use of lower tranches as security for higher tranches, the
principal tools for according a large percentage of an offering an AAA rating are:
(1) overcollateralization, where the face value of the mortgages loans backing a
security add up to more, sometimes considerably more, than the face value of
the securities;"' (2) insurance, usually offered by so-called monoline insurers
whose business primarily involves insuring securities; and (3) the credit rating
3
process itself.1'
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Jurek and Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured Finance,Harv Bus S Working Paper 09-060 at 7
(2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287363 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
The success of the tranche system depends crucially on the assumption that the risks of different
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assets in the pool are uncorrelated. So if, for example, all of the assets in a particular securitizanon
were residential mortgage loans, it is much less likely that a AAA rating for a top tranche would
be justified if the underlying mortgages were from a limited number of localities, especially if
those localities were "hot" real estate markets. Yet it is unclear (indeed unlikely) that the tranche
and overcollateralization approach used in rating residential mortgage securities involves actual
examination of the underlying mortgage loans backing a particular issuance to test these more
sophisticated statistical issues. That is one reason why some critics advocate sufficient disclosure
with regard to individual underlying mortgages loans so that the purchaser of the securities could
make an independent judgment.
Some securitized offerings involved several AAA tranches. In such cases, the top tranche was
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commonly called the "supersenior" tranche because it received income even before other AAA
tranches. It is characteristic of the current turmoil that some banking institutions attempted to
protect themselves by buying only supersenior tranches (some originating banks retained the
supersenior tranche on their own books). But these supersenior tranches also experienced losses
under mark-to-market accounting as investors sought to flee the entire residential mortgage sector
or were forced to sell in order to avoid liquidity problems. See Tett, Fool's Gold at 203-08 (cited in
note 97).
Coval, Jurek and Stafford, The Economics of StructuredFinanceat 6-7 (cited in note 127).
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On the process, including examples, of using financial engineering to manufacture high ratings on
tranched products (that is, not just mortgage-backed securities but Collateralized Debt
Obligations ("CDOs") and similar pooling of assets), consider Efraim Benmelech and Jennifer
Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings, NBER Working Paper 14878 (2009), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1391825
(visited Nov 21, 2009). The
authors find that in a large set of Collateralized Loan Obligations ("CLOs"), a majority of
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The securities created in this securitization process were sold not just in the
US but throughout the world. And many of the investors were banks. According
to press reports, the Bank of China held nine billion dollars' worth of securities
backed by US subprime mortgages when the crisis erupted in the summer of
2007.132
The resulting securities were especially hard for purchasers to evaluate,
hence the tendency to rely on credit rating agencies-one reason that the
securities were much more complex than the "plain vanilla" securities described
above. John B. Taylor and Kenneth E. Scott describe the stunning complexities
of some securitized mortgage-backed offerings:
Some of the tranches from one mortgage pool were combined with
tranches from other mortgage pools, resulting in Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations (CMO). Other tranches were combined with tranches from
completely different types of pools, based on commercial mortgages, auto
loans, student loans, credit card receivables, small business loans, and even
corporate loans that had been combined into Collateralized Loan
Obligations (CLO). The result was a highly heterogeneous mixture of debt
securities called Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). The tranches of
the CDOs could then be combined with other CDOs, resulting in CDO2.
["CDO squared']
Each time these tranches were mixed together with other tranches in a new
pool, the securities became more complex. Assume a hypothetical CDO2
held 100 CLOs, each holding 250 corporate loans -- then we would need
information on 25,000 underlying loans to determine the value of the
security. But assume the CDO2 held 100 CDOs each holding 100 RMBS
33
comprising a mere 2,000 mortgages-the number now rises to 20 millionP
As a strategy, the securitization of mortgage loans can be quite profitable, but it
is vulnerable to crisis, especially because institutional purchasers of the securities
borrow to finance the purchase (using the increased leverage to increase yield
from the investment). At least three generic mishaps can occur: the costs of
borrowing can go up, access to borrowing can dry up, or the assets bought with
borrowed money can fall in value. Since these three occurrences all happened in

132

133

tranches received AAA ratings while the average credit rating of the collateral was below
investment grade.
See Bloomberg News, Chinese Bank has $9 Billion in Subprime-Backed Securities, NY Times C7 (Aug
24, 2007); Ian McConnell, Bank of China Reassures Over Debt Exposure, Herald Scotland (Feb 19,
2008), online at http://www.heraldscotland.com/bank-of-china-reassures-over-debt-exposure1.874938 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Kenneth E. Scott and John B. Taylor, Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard to Clean Up, Wall St J Al 3
(July 20, 2009).
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this crisis,1 14 the capital adequacy approach enshrined in Basel I and carried over,
with modifications, into Basel II needs to be reexamined.
Quite aside from any imperfections in Basel I and 1I, the capital adequacy
approach to bank regulation cannot deal adequately with the problem. First, on
the originating side, it is important to observe that many, if not most, of the
institutions that make the mortgage loans are not banks in the regulatory sense
and are not subject to bank regulation. Rather, a great many are mortgage
companies (usually referred to as mortgage brokers) that originate mortgage
loans but usually do not hold mortgages to maturity. In the past, especially
beginning in the 1980s, these mortgage brokers originated the mortgage loans
and sold them to GSEs, which packaged them in MBSs, which were then sold to
investors. Later many commercial and investment banks chose to take on a
securitizing role. These securitized offerings began to be referred to as private
label MBSs to differentiate them from GSE-securitized offerings. An advantage
to the banks through securitization was that as soon as the mortgage loans were
securitized and the securities were sold, there was nothing left on the banks'
books and so there was nothing to which capital adequacy regulation would
apply; and yet the bank had made money on the transaction. 3 '
Nonetheless, capital adequacy regulation applies to banks that buy MBSs.
The buying banks obviously are subject to bank regulation, and many other
buyers, such as insurance companies, are also regulated. Under capital adequacy
regulation, whether or not of the kind found in Basel I and II, capital would
need to be maintained with respect to such purchased assets. Not to worry! The
buying banks could place these securities off the balance sheet in STVs.
Alternatively, buying banks could buy directly from SIVs sponsored by the
originating bank. Most banking authorities did not attempt to exercise
jurisdiction directly over SIVs, on the theory that the SIVs were not banks (even
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In addition, in the residential mortgage-backed securities field, the owners of the homes in
question often were facing increased interest rates on their adjustable rate loans due to "reset"
provisions that called for the loans' interest rates to rise to market rates after an initial low-interest
period. And in the subset of mortgage-backed securities involving subprime mortgages, the
creditworthiness of the borrowers tended to decline with the deterioration in economic
conditions, even assuming that the borrowers could afford the home at the outset. And, of
course, with the fall of house prices in recent years, the value of the collateral fell, and many
homeowners decided simply to mail in their keys to the lender and abandon their homes.
For the history of securitization summarized in this paragraph, consider Christopher L. Peterson,
Predatory Structured Finance, 28 Cardozo L Rev 2185 (2006-07), and authorities cited therein. See
also Vinod Kothari, SecueitiZation: The FinancialInstrument of the Future 108-86 (John Wiley & Sons
2d ed 2006).
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though they were bank-sponsored) and the securities were just investments by a
non-bank.36

37
The SIVs, in the minds of the banks, were primarily a funding vehicle.
The SIVs issued commercial paper sold directly to institutional investors such as
money market funds.'3 8 The SIVs used the proceeds of the commercial paper
(and sometimes junior notes) in order to buy US-origin MBSs. In order to sell
the commercial paper at a reasonable price, the SIVs pledged the MBSs they
were in the process of purchasing as collateral for the commercial paper they
were selling to pay for those securities. This SIV-issued commercial paper was
therefore referred to as asset-backed commercial paper or, more precisely,
mortgage-backed commercial paper.
Numerous reports by the IMF, the FDIC, and other bodies raised warning
flags in the spring of 2007."39 Despite the regulatory concern, no public worries
were yet evident about the ballooning volume of purchases by banks and other
institutions throughout the world of securitized products that included subprime
mortgages. Worries did not arise publicly until, suddenly, some purchasers of the
mortgage-backed commercial paper from the SIVs refused to roll over the
commercial paper. They were concerned about buying the commercial paper
from faceless SIVs in view of the growing doubts of informed observers about
the value of the collateral." To the extent the collateral for the commercial
paper consisted of securities based on mortgages, the commercial paper became
regarded as less than safe, however high the rating accorded by the rating
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For more detail on SIVs and their history, consider Joseph R. Mason, Structuring for Leverage:
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CPDOs, SIVs and ARSs, Brookings-Tokyo Club-Wharton Conference Paper (Nov 17, 2008),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1288051 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Special purpose vehicles ("SPVs"), which are simply a broader concept than SIVs, are used for
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other purposes, including securitization of assets other than mortgages. In discussing SIVs in the
text, I have chosen to use the past tense only because the use of SIVs has fallen out of fashion
with the financial crisis, but SIVs could well return to fashion, depending on the nature of
reforms now under consideration.
Under US practice, the term "commercial paper" refers to debt obligations sold to institutions,
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usually of a maturity of less than 270 days to avoid certain SEC regulatory provisions.
A quick Google search will lead to numerous reports in prior months by the IMF, the FDIC, and
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other bodies raising warning flags. In considering why it took so long for the problem to reach
the attention of the supervisory authorities, it is important to understand how rapidly the market
for securitized mortgage loans, particularly subprime loans, grew: "[I]n 2001, just 46 percent of
subprime and Alt-A [another form of non-traditional real estate loans] mortgages were
securitized; by 2007 that figure had reached 93 percent." Scott, The Global FinancialCrisis at 3
(cited in note 89). Moreover, it appears that the percentage of total US mortgage loans that were
subprime was growing rapidly as well.
Since the mortgage-backed securities were long-term and commercial paper is by definition quite
short-term, the collapse of the SIVs is a good illustration of the danger of lending long and
borrowing short. See Geithner, Reducing Systemic Risk (cited in note 97).
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agencies. The rating agencies had issued their ratings based on whether interest
and principal on the MBSs would be paid when due. In issuing their ratings,
these agencies were not offering a judgment on whether the SIVs would be able
to roll over the short-term commercial paper with which they financed their
holdings while seeking to sell those holdings to ultimate investors. Once the
commercial paper market began to refuse to roll the commercial paper over, the
SIVs had no alternative but to sell at whatever price available the MBSs they had
bought with the expiring commercial paper. Since the SIVs were simply vehicles
without their own resources, continuing to hold the securities was not a realistic
option. The result of those sales was that as the commercial paper markets
began to seize up, the prices of even highly rated MBSs began to plunge. A cycle
followed in which the process fed on itself. Investing banks and other
institutions had to announce write-offs of their existing holdings of MBSs under
accounting rules that required them to "mark to market ' 141 their securities.
The result was the full-blown crisis that first erupted in the summer of
2007 and which continued for many months. The press tended to focus on
problems of various institutions that had invested in large amounts of MBSs
distributed through the securitization process. 14 2 But more bad news was to
come. Some of the originating banks (not just investing institutions) began to
experience problems. Some of those originating banks had undertaken to take
back securities that had fallen significantly in ratings or values. Other originating
banks had undertaken (as a "liquidity facility") to provide their SIVs (or other
intermediary purchasers) with additional funds when commercial paper
financing became unavailable. Others took the securities back for reputational
reasons: they wanted to be seen as standing behind their deals. Many banks were
both issuers of MBSs and also investors in such securities. Indeed, many were
forced investors simply because they were "warehousing"' 43 the securities.
Increasingly, banks were forced to warehouse MBSs simply because they were
hard to sell when market demand became surfeited and ultimate buyers were
141

142

143

"Mark to market" simply refers to rules requiring use of current market prices, rather than
historical cost or alternative methods, in valuing assets.
See, for example, Rupini Bergstrom, Moving the Market: Bear Steams to Cut 650 Jobs, In Its Third
Round of Lajoffs, Wall St J (Nov 29, 2007), online at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119627127466406726.html (visited Nov 21, 2009); Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of Blame in the
Mortgage Mess, NY Times (Sept 30, 2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/
business/30view.html (visited Nov 21, 2009) (explaining the securitization process in layman's
terms and launching a criticism specifically about the way mortgage-backed securities were
handled); Floyd Norris, In This Mess, FingerPointingis in Syle, NY Times (July 27, 2007), online at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fulpage.htmlres=9503E5DE173CF934A15754C0A9619C8B63
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
"Warehousing" refers to accumulating pools of mortgage loans pending securitization and
holding the resulting securities in inventory pending their sale.
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plagued by emerging doubts. When banks found it necessary to reduce their
warehoused inventory, the result was that market prices began to fall. The
process quickly turned into a crisis-the subprime crisis-that became front144
page news.

IV.

A SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES BEHIND THE REGULATORY
FAILURE

In the US, the 2008 presidential election was deeply affected by political
attitudes toward the housing market and the role of financial institutions in
financing that market. As the result of competition for votes, most of the public
attention was paid to the plight of the homeowners who were losing their
homes. But throughout the world and in the US, regulatory officials, scholars
and financial experts have continued to question what should be done in
financial regulation in the downstream markets for mortgage loans securities.
One regulatory issue involved the rating agencies (especially Moody's, Standard
and Poor's, and Fitch) that had given AAA ratings to the top tranches' 45 of the
securitizations. Another involved the application of capital adequacy rules to
various aspects of the securitization process. There are many other specific
regulatory issues, the most important of which are discussed in the remainder of
this article.
The initial problem with the securities was, however, not regarded as a
rating agency problem nor as a capital adequacy problem, but rather as a liquidity
problem in credit markets.'4 6 Capital adequacy regulations and the Basel
agreements have little to say on the subject of liquidity. Of course, market risk is
considered in Basel 11.147 And to the extent that Basel II deals with risk
management within banks, it also appears to deal with these kinds of problems.
But a fair assessment of the problems indicates that bank regulatory agencies
had taken a narrow view of their responsibilities-narrow at least given the state

144
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For a description of the main events in the crisis, see International Monetary Fund, FinancialStress

and Deleveraging,Global Financial Stability Report 5-20 (Oct 2008); Scott, The GlobalFinancialCrisis
1-10 (cited in note 89); Scott, InternationalFinanceat 597-653 (cited in note 38).
A frequent occurrence was that even above the AAA tranche was to be found a "supersenior"
AAA tranche. See Tett, Foofs Goldat 204 (cited in note 97).
For a discussion of the misunderstanding of the concept of liquidity in the early stages of the
crisis, and even today, see Tobias Adrian and Hun Song Shin, The Shadow Banking System:
ImpIicalionsforFinandalRegulation 10, Fed Reserve Bank of NY Staff Rep 382 (2009).
Market risk was first incorporated in Basel I in a 1996 amendment. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking
on Basel The Future of InternationalFinancial Regulation 61 (Peterson Inst 2008) (noting that this
incorporation "foreshadowed Basel II").
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of globalization and financial engineering. 148 The financial engineering involved
in mortgage securitization was initially praised when it was seen as diversifying
risks away from mortgage lenders. The problem was that hardly any regulators
apparently knew, or perhaps even worried about to whom the risks actually were
diversified. Nor did regulators at first consider whether some or all of the risk
was actually retained de facto through liquidity commitments to sponsored SIVs
or because of the securitizing bank's need to provide liquidity to the off-balance
sheet SIVs in order to protect the bank's commercial reputation. Indeed,
originating banks, in their rush to book higher and higher bank revenues,
ignored the possibility that their financial engineering (that is, the practice of
securitizing mortgages into
SIVs or other off-balance sheet entities) would lead
49
to losses in the long run.1
In view of the decentralization of international financial regulation to
individual countries, it is fair to say that US regulators were not particularly
worried about non-US purchasers of the securities. Indeed, they probably had
no jurisdiction to investigate foreign purchasers' behavior. If the securities
themselves were a problem, they apparently raised no securities regulation issues
for the SEC in the US or in other countries where the securities were sold.'
And, of course, when the commercial paper market froze up, the Fed had no
choice but to throw money at the problem by providing more liquidity to money
markets and to move to head off any resulting recession by driving interest rates
lower (while subordinating concerns about future inflation).'' However, the
resulting credit crunch, bailouts, and recession are beyond the scope of this
study, which focuses on financial regulation issues.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The subprime crisis and the ensuing financial meltdown unleashed a
remarkable degree of careful study of proposed regulatory responses by
148 By "financial engineering," I mean the process by which financial institutions seek to enhance
profits and gain customers for their financial products and services by devising ways to avoid
existing rules that would otherwise constrain them.
149 Consider Tett, Fool's Gold at 167-254 (cited in note 97); see also Turner Review at 15-17 (cited in
note 13).
150 Of course, in the wake of the crisis, extensive private litigation challenging the adequacy or truth
of the disclosures made by the issuers of mortgage-backed securities has already begun. On the
other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that that the disclosures made with respect to particular
issuances were often necessarily so long and complex that purchasers made little use of the
disclosures in making their decisions or indeed may not even have bothered to read the disclosure
documents, especially where the securities were rated AAA by the rating agencies.
151 The many steps taken in that direction by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve in connection
with the subprime crisis and the ensuing credit crisis are beyond the scope of this paper.
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academics, voluntary groups, governments, international institutions and Basel
institutions such as the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. On the basis of this advance work, the US Treasury issued
its conclusions in its June 2009 FinancialRegulatory Reform: A New Foundation12 as
to what reforms should be enacted by the US Congress. Some proposed reforms
were already watered down to meet known or predicted Congressional
objections. Nevertheless, since the publication of the US Treasury's proposed
reforms, the Congressional process has already demonstrated a tendency-under
the combined influences of heavy lobbying, interest group politics, and
Congressional reactions to the changing themes and revelations of the twentyfour hour news cycle-to remove many of the proposals advanced for reform,
including some that survived the G20 international process." 3 As Mervyn King,
governor of the Bank of England, put it, "To paraphrase a great wartime leader,
never in the field of financial endeavour has so much money been owed by so
few to so many [and] so far with so little real reform."' 4
Reports available at this writing include publications by several Basel
institutions (the Financial Stability Board as well as the Banking Committee on
Banking Supervision),' three leading private sector groups (Group of Thirty, 5 6
152

Consider US Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation (June
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2008), online at http://financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009).
Tom Braithwaite and Francesca Guerrera, FinancialRegulators Strain to Come Up with US Reform

Plan, Fin Times 6 (Oct 27, 2009); Brooke Masters, Long Road to Regulation (Oct 23, 2009), online at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/73f55fde-bf6d-1 lde-a696-00144feab49a,dwpuuid=a947959aba4e-1lde-9dd7-00144feab49a.html (visited Nov 21, 2009); Martin Wolf, How to Manage the
Gigantic Financial Cuckoo in Our Nest (Oct 21, 2009), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/
97e0f540-bda9-1 lde-9f6a-00144feab49a.html (visited Nov 21, 2009) ;Gretchen Morgenson, Don't
Let Exceptions Kill the Rule, NY Times (Oct 17, 2009), online at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/10/18/business/economy/18gret.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). On the congressional
realities of financial regulatory reform, consider Tom Braithwaite, Financial Bills Take Stumbling
Steps, Fin Times (Oct 15, 2009), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8c8437e2-b918-llde98ee-00144feab49a.html (visited Nov 21, 2009); Simon Johnson and James Kwak, It's Crunch Time:
The Fight to Fix the FinancialSystem Comes Down to This, Wash Post (Sept 29, 2009), online at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/29/AR20090929tml6.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
154 Menyn King on Banks: The Ky.Quotesfrom His October 20 Speech, The Telegraph (UK) (Oct 21, 2009),
online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6394077/Mervyn-King-on-banks-thekey-quotes-from-his-October-20-speech.html (visited Nov 21, 2009) (emphasis added).
155 The Basel Committee on Banking Committee on Banking Supervision has released a stream of
reports, which are available at http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/index.htm. Publications of the
Financial Stability Board are available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_
pubications/index.htm. For an informal, but insightful, review of the work of the Basel
institutions, see Daniel K. Tarullo, InternationalCooperationto Modernize FinancialRegulation, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance, Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, InternationalCooperation to Modernize FinancialRegulation (Sept
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Institute of International Finance,'5 7 and Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation), and to a limited extent the US Treasury, in its previously discussed
Blueprint" 8 and its proposal on behalf of the Obama administration to the US
Congress. 9 In the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) published a
report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer by the FSA's Chairman, Lord
Turner. 60 The European Commission published a report of its High Level
Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, referred to generally as the de
Larosire Report after the Group's chairman, Jacques de Larosire.' 6 ' Many of
the proposals of these groups are discussed below,' 6 2 but at the outset it is worth
expressing some skepticism about broad arguments against the entire process of
securitization that are sometimes expressed.
A. Securitization
Any sensible reform of securitization requires recognition of the value of
securitization. This financial innovation has been an important technique for
financing enterprise in the US since at least 1980. It is heavily used by US
business for financing current operations (for example, securitizing accounts
receivable in order to improve cash flow).' 63 The use of securitization for
30, 2009), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo2009930a.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009). Consider Bank for International Settlements, BCBS Joint Forum Report on
Special Purpose Entiies (Sept
2009),
online
at
http://www.iaisweb.org/___temp/
JointForumReport.onSpecialPurposeEntities_29_September_2009.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009) (providing eight recommendations for the regulation of special purpose entities).
156 Consider Group of Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability (Jan 15, 2009),
online at http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
157 Consider Institute of International Finance ("IIF"), Interim Report of the IIF Committee on
Market Best Practices (Apr 2008). The 11F is an association of major international banks
throughout the world; its chairman at the time of the report was Josef Ackermann of Deutsche
Bank. The IIF report is not primarily concerned with bank regulation but rather with "best
practices" to be followed by banks.
158 A Group of Thirty report covers much the same ground as the Bush Treasuy Blueprint. Consider
Group of Thirty, The Structure of FinandalSupervision(cited in note 72).
159 Consider Obama Treasury Proposal(cited in note 87).
160

Consider Turner Review (cited in note 13).

161 Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Feb 25, 2009), online at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/docs/de-larosierereport-en.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009).
162 An important subject on the current regulatory reform agenda involves credit default swaps
("CDSs"). However, it is not addressed in this paper because the relation of the CDS problem to
the subprime crisis is tangential. For an overview of CDS issues, see CCMR, The Global Financial
Crisis:A Planfor Regulatoy Reform at 33-57 (cited in note 2).
163 For a demonstration of the benefits of credit card securitization, see Charles W. Calomiris and
Joseph R. Mason, Credit Card SecuitiZation and Regulatoy Arbitrage, FRB of Philadelphia Working
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financing home mortgages seems to some commentators to be a relatively recent
innovation. But it has been used by government-sponsored enterprises such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for many years. 64 The positive results of
securitization included not merely diversification of risks beyond the banking
sector but also increased availability of funds for housing, lower costs and more
efficient use of capital-at least until securitization contributed to the present
international financial crisis. Moreover, as the IMF emphasized in its September
2009 Global Financial Stability Report, a recovery in loan securitization markets,
which had collapsed in the recent financial crisis, is "critical" to economic
recovery.165

B. Securitization in Housing
Not only is securitization in general a useful financial technique, but it is a
particularly useful financing technique in the real estate sector and therefore
should not be prohibited. Putting aside for one moment the subprime problem,
securitization has been an important and highly desirable innovation in the use
of capital markets to finance purchases of homes. Some decades ago virtually all
financing of individual home purchases in the US was provided from within the
local community.'66 Not only was that an inefficient arrangement, but it was also
unfair because poor people in lower income areas found home financing hard to
obtain and unduly expensive. This condition in turn led to a rapid growth of
securitization of home mortgage loans, in part due to inefficient government
subsidy and guarantee programs. 167 It also led to the rise of large, implicitly
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Paper No 03-7 at 10-24 (April 2003) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that credit card
securitization is efficient contracting and not an abuse).
See David Reiss, The Federal Government'sImplied Guaranteeof FannieMae and Freddie Mac's Obligalions:

165

Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 Ga L Rev 1019, 1030 (2008) (explaining that securitization of
mortgages has been taking place for over three decades).
International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stabilioy Report: Navigating the Financial Challenges

166

Ahead 77
(Oct
2009),
online
at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/
2009/02/pdf/text.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). For more detail, consider id at 1-74, 78; Chris
Giles, IMF Fears Rules Will Kill Off Securitisation, Fin Times 9 (Sept 22, 2009), online at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54d5c1c8-a7Of-1lde-bdl4-00144feabdc.htm?ncick-check=1
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
See Frame and White, 19 J of Econ Perspectives at 159-61 (cited in note 52) (explaining that the

167

GSEs were able to have national scope in an era where most lending happened locally); see also
Reiss, 42 Ga L Rev at 1030 (cited in note 164).
For information on the growth of securitization of home mortgage loans and the growth of
subprime loans as a proportion of total mortgage loans in the US, see CCMR, The GlobalFinandal
Crisis:A Planfor Regulatory Reform at 12-15, 19-20 (cited in note 2).
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subsidized but privately owned GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.' 68
These enterprises popularized securitization of home mortgages. Indeed, until
relatively recently these GSEs were expanding their capacity to guarantee and
securitize mortgages to much larger levels, presumably in order to deal with the
impact of the subprime problem on the housing industry but also in order to
increase the volume of their business. 169 The IMF has made a strong case that
recovery of securitization markets, especially in the US, is "critical to limiting the
real sector fallout from the credit crisis amid financial sector deleveraging
pressures. '17 Thus, as suggested below, the challenge is to make regulatory
changes to prohibit or discourage the abuses that led to the subprime crisis.
C. Off-Balance Sheet Entities
The feature of securitization that has received the most criticism is the use
of off-balance sheet entities, referred to as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs),
such as SIVs and conduits. 7 ' SIVs, which play a key role in the subprime
meltdown, are by design poorly capitalized and often highly leveraged.'72 But it
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Christopher L. Peterson, Over-Indebtedness, Predatoy Lending and the InternationalPolitical Economy of

169

Residential House SecuritiZation: Comparing the United States' Subpime Home Mortgage Lending Crisis to
Home Finance in the United Kingdom, Germany, andJapan, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of
Law
Working
Paper
at
4-6
(2008),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1083184 (visited Nov 21, 2009) (tracking the nature of GSEs and their
complex structure).
See Peter J. Wallison and Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Trillion Dollar Commitment: The Destruction

of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 1-8 (Sept 2008), online at http://www.aei.org/doclib
/20080930 Binderl .pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009); Scott, GlobalFinandalCrisisat 3 (cited in note 89);
Scott, InternationalFinance at 598 (cited in note 38). For example, one change partially lifted a cap
imposed by their regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), on
their total authority to buy and guarantee mortgages by $200 billion. Saskia Scholtes, Fannie and
Freddie to Boost Mortgage Market, Fin Times 2 (Mar 20, 2008) (reporting this was done by reducing
their capital requirements from 30 percent to 20 percent).
170 International Monetary Fund, GlobalFinancialStabiliy Report at 77 (October 2009) (cited in note
165). The case for restarting securitization markets is laid out in Chapter 1 of this IMF Financial
Stability Report and summarized in Chapter 2, Box 2.1 thereof.
171 "Conduits" are entities sponsored but not owned by the originating banks and other originating
172

financial entities.
A study of Special Purpose Vehicles, of which SIVs are only one example, found that they
"typically" are "thinly capitalized," "have no independent management or employees," have
"[t]heir administration functions performed by a trustee who follows prespecified rules with
regard to the receipt and distributions of cash," take "no other decisions," "are serviced via a
servicing arrangement," and "are structured so that they cannot become bankrupt as a practical
matter." Gary Gorton and Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Pupose Vehicles and Securii.Zation, NBER
Working Paper 11190 at 1-2 (2005), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=713782 (visited Nov 21,
2009).
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would be a mistake to prohibit their use. 1 73 The press has popularized the notion
that these entities function as part of a "shadow financial system, 174 but that is a
distortion of reality. In truth, everyone in the financial world either knows or can
easily determine the sponsoring bank for any SIV.'77 An SIVs purpose is to
create a bankruptcy firewall between the mortgage loan originator and the
investor, so that an investor cannot bring an action against the originator for
nonpayment of principal and interest by the original mortgagor. In the jargon of
finance, SIVs are "bankruptcy remote."
The elimination of off-balance sheet entities would likely put an end to
securitization even for uncontroversial uses because the securitization technique
depends upon creation of a bankruptcy-remote SPV. Perhaps a bankruptcy
firewall seems unfair to the investors, but investors who did any "due diligence"
would be well aware of the firewall when they bought the securities. Indeed,
even assuming that securitization could occur without the bankruptcy firewall
feature, the return to the investor would likely have to be lower to compensate
the originator for the greater risk incurred. Certainly, it is a financial truism that
on average the higher the return, the higher the risk. Investors, both in the US
and Europe and even in China, were attracted by the higher return but chose to
ignore that higher risk until they suddenly found the prices of their securitized
mortgage investments falling. In view of the widespread use of securitization in
financing a wide variety of "automobile loans, credit card receivables, trade
173

A possible compromise would be to allow use of off-balance sheet entities, but to require that

174

some portion of a securitized offering by banks remain on the bank's books to insure that the
bank had some "skin in the game." This reform, usually called "retention," has been advocated in
many studies and reports. The principal advantage would presumably be an improvement in the
originating bank's accountability. See Fear and Loathing, and a Hint of Hope-Securifisaion, The
Economist (Feb 16, 2008). But, of course, to the extent that securitization has an economic
rationale, some of the economic advantages would be dissipated. A retention requirement would
seem to be a less direct way of discouraging improper or misleading originating bank behavior
than would be a requirement of fuller or better disclosure of all aspects of the particular
securitization. In short, where securities are concerned, disclosure usually beats mandatory rules.
Nonetheless, retention may be more effective because it requires the securitizing bank to bear
some of the losses. Ironically, as the subprime meltdown progressed, it became clear that some of
the largest financial losses were incurred by originating banks that had subprime securities
warehoused on their own books. This was either because they had not yet been able to sell them
or because they had chosen to take the securities back onto their own books when their
sponsored SIVs were unable to roll over their short-term commercial paper financing of the SIVs'
holdings of those securities.
See, for example, Robert Lenzner, Look Out Below, Forbes (Feb 2, 2009), online at

175

http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0225/036a.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
For a more nuanced treatment of what is involved in an SIV, consider Basel Committee on
Banking
Supervision,
Report
on
Special
Purpose Entiies
(2009),
online
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009). (An SIV is just one form of "special
purpose entity.'")
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receivables, home equity loans, leases of real property or equipment (e.g.,
airplanes), education loans, junk bonds, boat loans, and even oil or gas
reserves, ' it would be unwise to take steps to undermine the securitization
technique merely to deal with problems arising in the mortgage loan market.
Rather, it would be wiser to deal directly with the abuses that have arisen, for
example, in the subprime mortgage field and/or the consumer mortgage
origination field.
D. Covered Bonds
An alternative to securitization of the type that led to the subprime crisis is
the covered bond. The covered bond certainly has been a success in some other
countries. This financial instrument, which is the principal way in many
countries (such as in Germany) to raise money in order to fund mortgage loans
for housing, involves keeping the loans on the bank's books, rather than selling
the loans. This financial instrument, referred to in Germany where it is today
most widely used as a Pfandbrief and more generically in the US as a covered
bond, has a history going back several centuries. It is in effect an MBS.
However, it is also an obligation of the originating bank, which keeps the assets
on its books and therefore does not shed its liability for principal and interest, as
in the case of securitization. Because the holder has a priority claim to the entire
assets of the bank as well as to the cash flow of the mortgage loans, it is a highly
rated instrument on which defaults are rare. It has become so popular in
Germany that it constitutes 25 percent of the entire fixed income market in that
177
country.
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Scott, InternationalFinance at 569 (cited in note 38).
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Verband Deutsche Pfandbriefbanken, The Pfandbrief-A Premium Product (Feb 26, 2008), online at
http://www.pfandbrief.org/d/internet.nsf/0/346DAA456C29D9AC125741FOO254245/$FILE
/PfandbriefPremiumProduct.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (describing the Pfandbrief, how it is
regulated, and comparing it to other financial instruments); Stefan Schilfer, Integration of EU
Mortgage Markets: It's the Fundin& Commissioner!, 38 EU Monitor 1, 8 (Oct 19, 2006), online at
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBRINTERNETDE-PROD/
PROD0000000000203497.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009); Fitch Ratings, ABCs of US Covered Bonds
(2008) (explaining the concept of a covered bond and reviewing the pros and cons); Frank Packer,
Ryan Stever and Christian Upper, The Covered Bond Market, BIS Q Rev 43, 45-51 (Sept 2007). The
pledge of the assets to the individual covered bond is designed to survive the insolvency of the
bank. Vinod Kothari, The Name is Bond. Covered Bond (Sept 5, 2008), online at
www.vinodkothari.com/covered / 20bonds / 20article / 20by /02Ovinod /020kothari.pdf
(visited
Nov 21, 2009). The underlying German legislation provides that the amount of the individual real
estate loans involved cannot exceed 60 percent of the value of the property. Two US banks,
namely Bank of America and Washington Mutual, have sold covered bonds. Karey Wutkowski,
Regulators OK guidance on covered bonds, capital, Reuters (July 15, 2008), online at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1 535012420080715 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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Both the Treasury and the FDIC sought to promote the covered bond as a
substitute for securitization in the last year of the Bush administration.' 78 But the
covered bond seems to have fallen off the Treasury agenda in the Obama
administration, though it remains popular in Europe and in Canada.' 79 The
FDIC in its role of deposit insurer has thus far limited its approval of covered
bonds by insured banks to 4 percent of bank assets, no doubt because the
priority accorded covered bondholders necessarily reduces the availability of
assets of insolvent
banks for payment of insured deposits in the event of
80
insolvency.
E. Capital Requirements
The key issue for capital adequacy regulation with regard to securitization is
whether banks maintained sufficient capital for off-balance-sheet exposures,
whether contractual or implicit. By "implicit" exposures, I refer to the fact that a
number of banks took SIV assets back onto their own balance sheets for
reputational reasons. In the international regulatory reform process, countries
quickly converged on the idea that off-balance sheet exposures should be treated
the same as on-balance-sheet exposures with regard to the amount of capital
required. Achieving this consensus was not a major point of contention, since
securitization of mortgage loans came nearly to a standstill during the worldwide
financial meltdown and therefore the question of the consolidation of on- and
off-balance sheet exposures would have little immediate consequence.
However, that consensus has not yet been translated into law and
regulations in most countries. Since the subject is capital adequacy regulation, an
178 US

Treasury,

Best Practices for Residential Covered Bonds 6

(July

28,

2008),

online

at

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/USCoveredBondBestPractices.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009); Fitch Ratings, ABCs of US Covered Bonds at 2 (cited in note 177). For a critique, see Bert Ely,
We Need FundamentalMortgage Reform, Wall St J AI9 (Sept 8, 2008). And for a discussion of the
impact of covered bonds on the FDIC and the safety net, see Richard Rosen, What Are Covered
Bonds?, Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Dec 2008), online at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedetter/cfldecember2008 257.pdf (visited Nov 21,
2009).
179 See, for example, Caroline Hyde and Paul Armstrong, RMB Issues C$750 Million ofFive-Year Covered
Bonds (Update 1), Bloomberg.com (Oct 30, 2009), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601082&sid=a4FcCm6HQ5jc (visited Nov 21, 2009); Roman Kessler, ECB: Total of
Settled Covered Bond Buys Hit EUR19.748 BIn, Dow Jones Newswire (Oct 26, 2009), online at
http://online.ws.com/article/BT-CO-20091026-702250.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
180 See Bob Eisenbeis, Sliced Bread or Double Dipping? More on Covered Bonds, Cumberland Advisors
Market Commentary (July 30, 2008), online at http://www.cumber.com/commentary.aspx?file=
073008.asp&n=l mc (visited Nov 21, 2009). The covered bond, unlike securitization, cannot be
used to escape capital adequacy regulation. This appears to be the case even when the covered
bonds are issued through an SPV since the very nature of a covered bond is that the bank remains
fully liable. See Fitch Ratings, ABCs of US Covered Bonds at 6-7 (cited in note 177).
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amendment to the Basel agreements will be required. Coming up with a Basel III
or a substitute for such an agreement can be expected to be contentious and
time-consuming. Indeed, many issues that would have to be resolved, even in
the US, could delay the resolution of many capital adequacy issues for some
time.18' Therefore, from the standpoint of the issues that arose in the initial
subprime crisis, it is important to nail down in law and regulation the
proposition with regard to equal treatment of on- and off-balance sheet
exposures, at least for securitization. Both US political parties seem to be in
agreement on that principle. The Bush-period President's Working Group, in its
interim report in early 2008, recommended that regulators "adopt policies that
provide incentives for financial institutions to hold capital and liquidity cushions
commensurate with firm-wide exposures (both on and off-balance sheet) to
severe adverse market events."' 8 2 The Obama administration has adopted a
similar approach, emphasizing the central importance of capital adequacy
requirements."'
With regard to this issue, of whether the capital requirements for a bank
should be any different just because a bank puts assets in an off-balance sheet
entity, it is important to understand that it was precisely the advantage of
securitization from the standpoint of the banks under the Basel approach
(specifically, Pillar I of Basel II) that banks could hold less capital through the
use of off-balance sheet vehicles even though they sponsored the off-balance
sheet entities. Under Basel I, a new Pillar I1(complementing Pillar I on capital
adequacy) gave national supervisory agencies discretion to increase capital
requirements of particular banks, but those regulatory agencies generally failed to
use the discretion afforded by Pillar II. Indeed, the US has not even formally
signed onto Basel II.
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For a review of capital adequacy reform issues that have developed over the period of the credit
crisis and the ensuing recession, which do not relate directly to the subprime crisis or
securitization, see CCMR, The GlobalFinandalCrisis:A Planfor Regulatoy Reform at 57-82 (cited in
note 2).
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Poliy Statement on FinandalMarketDevelopments 5
(March
2008),
online
at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
pwgpoicystatemktturmoil 03122008.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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US Treasury, Prindplesfor Reforming the US and InternationalRegulato~y CapitalFrameworkfor Banking
Firms (Sept 3,
2009), online
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/capitalstatement_090309.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009) (emphasizing that capital requirements should be a
principal regulatory tool for banking regulators); Timothy Geithner, FinandalStability Depends on
More Capital, Fin Times 7 (Sept 3, 2009), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/638b9eb2-98ballde-aalb-00144feabdcO.htnl (visited Nov 21, 2009) (emphasizing that new capital standards
should be the core of the reform and they should be designed so that the system is ensured
stability, "not just the solvency of individual institutions").
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The fact that negotiating a successor agreement to Basel II will be timeconsuming and doubtless difficult suggests that it would be wise, at least for the
US, to put into place definitive rules establishing the capital adequacy parity of
on- and off-balance sheet exposures in securitizations. Securitization has a
number of attributes, including bankruptcy remoteness that should be sufficient
to help securitization markets rebuild as the major economies recover from the
present recession.'8
F. Transparency
Whatever the best answer to accounting for off-balance sheet entities may
be from the standpoint of bank regulation, securitizations necessarily involve
securities and therefore the question of transparency for the benefit of investors
should be faced. One issue with regard to the subprime crisis is whether the
relationship between the originating financial institutions and the off-balance
sheet vehicles was sufficiently disclosed to investors. 8 ' The European banks that
bought the subprime securities surely knew quite well in general what was
involved. If the bankers involved are to be faulted, it is for greed or
obliviousness to risk, not for stupidity or for ignorance in the use of SIVs and
conduits. Without focusing on the incentives of the individuals involved, it is
difficult to understand the carelessness toward risk seen in many of the
purchasing banks, especially those that later had to be bailed out or merged or
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A more general question is whether the substantive rules on capital adequacy should be amended.
This question breaks down into several narrower ones: First, whether a risk-weighted approach
(under Basel) is superior to a leverage ratio-that is, a simple ratio of assets to capital. It is today
widely accepted that a simple leverage ratio that does not attempt to give different risk weightings
to different types of assets has actually done a better job than the supposedly highly sophisticated
Basel system of assigning different weights to different kinds of assets. This counterintuitive result
can be explained by the fact that politics has played a larger role than either economic analysis or
analysis of different default rates in assigning the weights. So, for example, home mortgages
lending was favored with reduced risk weightings compared to business loans (the former
required only 50 percent as much capital as the latter). Hence, risk weightings suffered from the
same enthusiasm for home ownership that pervaded much of US government policy, such as the
special status of the GSEs, even after the GSEs started loading up on subprime mortgage loans.
Current policy discussions of the risk-weighting issue favor retaining the risk-weighted approach
of the Basel agreements while establishing a simple leverage ratio as an independent capital
adequacy requirement; in short, a bank would have to meet both tests.
One possibility is that there was so much disclosure that the incentive to read the disclosure
documents was reduced by the time and boredom cost of doing so. A Financial Times columnist
reported that, with respect to CDO prospectuses, "[o]ne executive, the most 'sophisticated'
investor I know, told me it took him two days to read one cover to cover." Aline van Duyn,

Information Is Not Always of Value-Ask the Usual Suspects, Fin Times 22 (Aug 1, 2008).
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given massive infusions of capital.'86 Nevertheless, securities laws require certain
disclosures, and I am confident that there will be litigation under the securities
laws, at least in the US, based
on nondisclosure or fraudulent disclosure with
18 7
regard to subprime securities.
One transparency question is raised by the possibility that some originating
banks entered into undisclosed contractual guarantees of securitized mortgage
loan issues. The failure to disclose these contractual guarantees did not hurt the
investors in the securities directly, though it did mislead and often hurt investors
in the securitizing banks. But such cases do illustrate the possibility that the use
of off-balance sheet vehicles coupled with undisclosed contractual guarantees
was more a matter of form than economic substance, and should be a concern
of bank regulators (because of the enhanced risk to the banks) and perhaps a
concern of securities regulators as well. One obvious recommendation is that
originating banks should be required to consolidate off-balance sheet entities for
reporting purposes (and not just for calculation of capital adequacy).' 88
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Executive compensation, particularly bonus arrangements, explains some risky behavior on the
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part of selling banks, even if not also on the part of buying banks. Hence, it is popular with
politicians to propose regulation of bankers' compensation. The French government has been
particularly strong in the G20 process in supporting strong caps on bankers' bonuses. G20 Rift
Opens on Banking Reform, Fin Times 1 (Sept 5, 2009). In my opinion, direct regulation of
compensation is likely to have unintended consequences (such as in the US where an earlier
legislative limit on cash compensation led to more extravagant stock option grants in lieu of
greater cash compensation). A better approach would be to strengthen corporate governance to
assure that the financial executive's compensation plans provided incentives that were better
aligned with shareholders' interests. The Obama administration has supported a requirement that
firms should be required to submit compensation practices for shareholder approval. Timothy
Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, Statement at the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors (Sept 5, 2009), online at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
tg277.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (commenting that the House has passed legislation requiring
firms to submit compensation practices for shareholder approval, with the Fed given the power
to enforce heightened standards through the supervisory process). The fact that bonuses earned
in one year never had to be paid back if the activities that earned the bonus led to losses in future
years has given rise to proposals to measure entitlement to bonuses over a multi-year period.
Certainly, measurements of profits over longer terms than a year should be used for bonuses. See
An Open Letter to President-ElectObama at 7 (cited in note 53) (last paragraph).
See Joanna Chung, Subprime Crisis Spurs PrivateLawsuits, Fin Times 6 (Sept 11, 2008) (counting 607
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civil cases in the US federal courts related to the meltdown in the subprime mortgage market
during the eighteen months prior to the end of June 2008). It is, however, not clear how many of
those cases involved disclosure issues. On the issues that arise in litigation involving the subprime
crisis, consider Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell, and Gung Hu, Legal and EconomicIssues in Li'igation
Arisingfrom the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis, Harvard L School Olin Disc Paper No 612 (Oct 2008),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1096582 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
For a discussion of consolidation issues, see Scott, The Global FinancialCrisis at 143-49 (cited in
note 89).
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G. Credit Rating Agencies
Perhaps the feature of securitization that has received the most public
attention in the US is the granting of AAA (triple A) ratings by the rating
agencies, such as Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch.189 These ratings
turned out to be wildly optimistic in a large number of subprime mortgage loan
securitizations,' 90 and the ratings of these agencies are often considered a major
causal factor in the subprime crisis.' 91 Hence, the credit rating agencies are a key
focus of many proposals for reform.
A number of regulatory issues are involved here. 92 For example, charges
have been made of conflict of interest because it is the issuer, not the investor
The many AAA ratings given to tranches in securitized offerings have also generated extensive
legislation: "The largest pension fund in the US, the California Public Employees' Retirement
System (Calpers) has filed a suit against the three leading rating agencies over potential losses of
more than Slbn over what it says are 'wildly inaccurate' triple A ratings. That is just one of many
[cases]. S&P currently faces around four dozen separate law suits from investors and institution."
Aline van Duyn and Joanna Chung, Ratings Ageng Model Left Largely Intact Fin Times 23 (July 22,
2009).
190 Rating agencies may have been overly optimistic with regard to securities in general. For example,
the top three agencies continued to give Lehman strong ratings until the day it filed for
bankruptcy. Beat Balzlie and Frank Hornig, The Power of Rating Agencies, Spiegel Online
International (May 6, 2009), online at http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/
0,1518,623197,00.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). But especially in the case of mortgage-backed
securities, the rating agencies implicitly acknowledged their over-optimism by belatedly
downgrading substantial percentages of residential mortgage-backed securities, including tranches
that had originally been rated AAA.
191 On the role of the credit rating agencies in the crisis, see Scott, The GlobalFinancialCrisis at 122-26
(cited in note 89) (discussing the conflicts of interest of the CRAs and the tendency of investors
to over-rely on the ratings); consider Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Rating Was a Primag
Cause of the Crisis, 27 Nota di Lavoro (Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei 2009). For a critique of the
methods of credit rating agencies and resulting inflated and low-quality ratings, see Charles W.
Calomiris, The Debasement of Ratings: What's Wrong and How We Can Fix It (2009), online at
http://www.economics2l .org/content/2the-debasement-ratings-whats-wrong-and-how-we-canfix-it (visited Nov 21, 2009). Calomiris points to studies emphasizing the error in assuming that
housing prices would not fall and in overreliance on FICO scores in no-doc and low-doc
mortgage loans (that is, mortgage loans made with no or low documentation provided by the
borrower to the lender about the borrower's income and employment). He points to studies
emphasizing the error in assuming that housing prices would not fall and in overreliance on FICO
scores in such no-doc and low-doc mortgage loans (that is, the likelihood of adverse selection in
the case of borrowers where they did not have to disclose their income or any information about
employment).
192 Some of the problems that have arisen with credit ratings involve a series of perverse incentives in
the securitization process, leading to practices such as ratings shopping and low-quality ratings. As
such, it is not obvious that regulation alone can fix the deficiencies in the rating process. Charles
W. Calomiris, The Debasement of Ratings: What's Wrong and How We Can Fix It (2009), online at
(visited
http://www.economics2l.nrg/fies/pdfs/in-depth-research/debasement-of-ratings.pdf
Nov 21, 2009).
189
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who pays for the ratings. The fact is that a rating has value to investors, but
nonetheless a subscription model under which institutional investors pay on a
calendar basis for ratings was apparently abandoned by credit rating agencies,
decades ago. 93 Economists may say that ratings are public goods, but until some
public means of paying for ratings emerges, payment by issuers is a solution,
even if perhaps a second-best or partial solution.'
A more immediate set of concerns is that in recent years, rating agencies
have generated a large proportion of their revenues by their consulting services.
As part of their consulting services, rating agencies give issuers advice on how to
qualify for higher ratings. And rating agencies certainly help issuers to structure
their offerings to obtain higher ratings by advising on various kinds of what are
called "credit enhancements."' 9 5 This advisory activity, which has been quite
profitable for credit rating agencies, leads to conflict of interest issues when the
credit rating agency then goes on to rate a security that has been structured
following the advice of the agency. The SEC consequently issued a rule to the
effect that any agency that has acted in an advisory capacity
on a securitization
19 6
may not also rate the securities in that securitization.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of ratings is that an investment grade
rating for securities is required by statute for some kinds of institutional
investors, such as banks and pension funds, to buy the securities (at least in the
US).197 A substantial number of US statutes and regulation rely on credit rating
193

See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers 62-64, USD
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Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No
07-46
(May
2006),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=900257 (visited Nov 21, 2009); Frank
Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, 27 Nota di Lavoro 3-4
(2009),
online
at
http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/B404FBlB-45F3-43E8-A2BO083076C3410B/2862/2709.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Some new entrants to the credit rating field are using a subscription business plan. Turmoilin the
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196

197

US Credit Markets: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies ("Coffee Testimony"), Hearing Before the
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 17 (Apr 22, 2008)
(testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr.), online
at http://banking.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStoreid=94ccc2ab-8401-4e4c-alb2-71 f36a9fd25b
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
Among the most important credit enhancements in the securitization process are (1) insurance
offered by so-called monoline insurers (who do not offer other types of insurance) and (2)
overcollateralization by means of the tranche (or waterfall) structure of mortgage-backed
securities offerings described above. See Section III.B.
SEC Issues Rules on Conflicts in Credit Rating, NY Times (Dec 4, 2008), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/business/economy/04sec.html (visited Nov 21, 2009).
The actual consequences of that prohibition are not clear because of an "industry custom of
submitting alternative secutitization structures to [a credit rating agency] until the desired rating is
achieved." Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Regulation of Credit Rating Organizations 2,
Statement No 265 (Dec 8, 2008).
Coffee Testimony at 2 (cited in note 194).
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in one way or another. In effect, regulation has favored the outsourcing of due
diligence to rating agencies, which ideally would be a prime activity of investors.
Thus, both the originating bank, which is presumably able to charge a higher
interest rate, and many US institutional investors, who need high ratings to buy
the security at all, have a vested interest in rating agencies awarding high ratings.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many buyers do not bother to incur the
expense to do their own due diligence.
In a partial step toward eliminating the influence of credit ratings in the
regulation process, the SEC has proposed to eliminate the use of credit ratings
from private credit agencies in its own regulations and procedures. 98 However,
the SEC has not yet adopted that proposal. A bill that would eliminate
references to ratings in certain statutes was approved by the House Financial
Service Committee but the agencies could apparently nevertheless make use of
credit ratings in their proceedings if they chose to do so. 99
The use of ratings for official SEC purposes has been criticized on the
ground that making ratings legally determinative leads to ratings inflation and
discourages due diligence by purchasers. A tendency of investors to rely on
ratings in lieu of doing their own due diligence certainly played a role in the
subprime fiasco even where the ratings did not provide a regulatory safe harbor,
and official use by the SEC of ratings could be expected to carry that tendency
even further. 200 Furthermore, using ratings from private sector agencies as a basis
for regulatory rules and decisions amounts to a delegation of governmental
power to private bodies. Yet Basel II relies on credit ratings in several respects,
and therefore the official use of credit ratings is likely to resurface as an issue. 0 '
198

The June 2009 Treasury proposal on behalf of the Obama administration did not make farreaching proposals concerning credit rating agencies. Obama Treasury Proposal at 46, 87 (cited in
note 87). See Aline van Duyn and Joanna Chung, Rating Ageny Model Left Lagely Intact Depte
Treasury Reform, Fin Times 31 (July 23, 2009). An SEC Roundtable later in 2009 endorsed the
elimination of prescriptive mandates from SEC regulations because giving legal effect to credit
ratings could be a cause of ratings inflation. At the time, the SEC had already had certain
regulatory powers with regard to the credit rating agencies. For recent SEC regulatory activity in

this regard, see SEC Press Release, SEC Votes on Measure to Further Strengthen Oversight of Credit

199

Rating Agencies (Sept 17, 2009), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200.htm
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
CQ Agencies, Today Midday Update, House Panel Moves to Tighten Regulation of Credit Rating
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Agencies (Oct 28, 2009), online at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?doclD=cqmidday000003233395 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
For critiques, see Richard Herring and Marshall Blume, Do the SEC's New Raling Ageny Rules Have

Any Bite?, Knowledge@Wharton (Dec 10, 2008), online at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=2112 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
201 In July 2009, the Obama administration proposed that statutory requirements to use credit ratings
be abolished, and the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee stated, "They're
going to all be repealed." Joanna Chung and Aline van Dyne, US Rating Agencies Escape Overhaul,
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In May 2008, the EU Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR) proposed an "international CRAs standard setting and monitoring body
to develop and monitor compliance with these international standards.. . using
full public transparency and acting in a 'name and shame' capacity to enforce
compliance with these standards via market discipline., 2 2 The new body would
be formed as an international body or, failing that, at the EU level. Meanwhile,
the European Commission is considering EU legislation based on an IOSCO
(International Organization of Securities Organizations) code. 20 3 This appears
thus far to be an example of a rush to regulation without having first identified
specific shortcomings to be addressed. It is ironic that the EU member securities
regulators themselves are making these proposals since they presumably had the
responsibility themselves to regulate the MBSs markets.2 4
Another problem with ratings is that they do not address several important
issues. First, since rating agencies rate the issuer's capacity to pay principal and
interest when due, the probable price performance of the securities is largely
ignored, despite the fact that under mark-to-market accounting a substantial
portion of the losses experienced to date have involved downward price
fluctuations, not defaults on the underlying mortgages loans. Quite without
regard to defaults on residential mortgages, price performance plays a major role
in investors' results because when market interest rates rise, the price of fixed
income investments falls (though hedging may minimize such losses).
Second and related, the rating agencies do not address liquidity in
secondary markets. The seizing up of various credit markets in the summer of
2007 underscores the importance to investors of liquidity. As previously
discussed, the seizing up of commercial paper markets used by SIVs to fund
purchases was the trigger for the onset of the crisis. The liquidity vulnerability
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Fin Times 4 (uly 22, 2009) (quoting Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee). Such proposals and statements fall well short, of course, of actual legislation.
Committee of European Securities Regulators Press Release, CESR Advises the European
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Commission to Take Stos and Offers Its Proposals to Enhance the Integriiy and Qualio of the Rating Process
(May 19, 2008), online at http://www.cesr.eu/popup2.php?id=5050 (visited Nov 21, 2009). See
Refining the Ratings Agencies, Will the US Follow Europe's Tougher Rules (Knowledge@Wharton, May
27, 2009), online at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2242 (visited Nov
21, 2009) (explaining that the EU rules are now much different from the US rules, and reporting
US reactions).
For a history of EU activity with regard to credit rating agencies, see Piero Cinquegrana, The
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Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies: A Comparative Perspective, ECMI Policy Brief No 12 § 3.2 (Feb
2009), online at http://www.ceps.be/ceps/download/1619 (visited Nov 21, 2009). See Rebecca
Ford, Proposalsfor the Regulation of Credit RatingAgencies in Europe, GTNews (Oct 21, 2008), online at
http://www.gtnews.com/article/7440.cfm (visited Nov 21, 2009); see also Nikki Tait, EU Votes
for Rating Ageng-Rules, Fin Times (April 23, 2009).
For specific suggestions on how to improve the credit rating process without resorting to massive
new regulation with new regulatory bodies, consider Coffee Testimony at 2 (cited in note 194).
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stems directly, of course, from the fact that the business model of banks is
based, as previously discussed,0 5 on borrowing short and lending long, a practice
carried to extremes in the short-term commercial paper financing of SIVs.
And third, in an effort apparently to be--or at least to appear to beobjective, rating agencies rely heavily (and perhaps in some cases exclusively) on
past payment experience with regard to similar securities. Since subprime
mortgage securitization (other than by the GSEs) is largely a phenomenon of the
several years prior to the crisis, which was a period in which US real estate prices
were rising steadily, the ratings failed to capture the lifetime risk in the
underlying mortgages.2 °6 It is therefore not surprising that the five-year default
rate on securitized products rated by Moody's just above the investment grade
qualifying level (Baa) was ten times higher than on corporate bonds at the same
level. 20z As defaults on residential MBSs rose, credit rating agencies began to
downgrade other outstanding securitized MBSs, causing widespread decline in
prices of such securities. 20 8 All financial institutions holding residential MBSs had
20 9
to book widespread losses under the mark-to-market principle.
H. Underwriting Standards
Another issue that has captured great public attention in the US is the lax
underwriting standards at the stage of the initial mortgage loans to subprime
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See Section III.
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See Bailey, Elmendorf and Litan, The Great Credit Squeeze at 33 (cited in note 66).
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Charles Calomiris and Joseph Mason, Reclaim Powerfrom the Rating Agencies, Fin Times 11 (Aug 24,
2007). On the systemic effects of rating crises, consider Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of
Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets, IMF Working Paper WP/09/129 (une 2009)
("unanticipated and abrupt credit rating downgrades"), online at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Herring and Blume, Do the SEC's New Rating Agengy Rules Have Any Bite? (cited in note 200).
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The issue of mark-to-market accounting (also called "fair value" accounting), under which some,
but not all, assets would be valued at current market prices rather than historical cost, has played a
major role in the debate over causes and remedies for the subprime crisis, but it is a complicated
subject well beyond the scope of this study. For an introduction to the issue, see Scott,
InternationalFinance at 646-53 (cited in note 38). For a short, clear analysis of the issues in the
subprime context, consider Robert C. Pozen, Is It Fairto Blame Fair Value for the FinancialCrisis?,
87 Harv Bus Rev 84 (Nov 2009). For detail, consider Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the Chief Accountant, Report and Recommendations Pursuantto Section 133 of the Ememeny
Economic Stabi#Zation Act of 2008: Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting (Dec 30, 2008), online at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf
(visited Nov 21, 2009).
Consider also Christian Laux and Christian Leuz, Did Fair Value Contribute to the FinancialCrisis?,
Chicago
Booth
Research
Paper
09-38
(Oct
12,
2009),
online
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487905 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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buyers. 210 Not only did many of the lenders purposely fail to exercise ordinary
banking prudence, but fraud by both borrowers and lenders was undoubtedly
part of the overall problem. But perhaps most of the problem arose from the
persistently skewed incentives of the parties involved in securitization.21 We can
be sure that the US administration and the US Congress will be focused on this
aspect of subprime mortgages, and the Obama administration has proposed a
plan to create a CFPA 212 that would be able to confront such issues. The
activities of such an agency could prove crucial to the re-launching of
securitization activity in the consumer real estate market.
It was, of course, the increasing defaults by US homebuyers, who bought
homes that they could not in the end pay for, that triggered the subprime crisis.
The general disposition in the US domestic political process has been, perhaps
reasonably in view of the extensive anecdotal evidence of lender fraud and of
no-documentation and low documentation loans, to blame the lenders rather
than the borrowers.
Here the European perspective is instructive. In Germany and in some
other European countries, it is difficult to obtain financing above 60 percent of a
home's value, and this fact is widely accepted by the citizenry. 213 The US focus
on affordable housing is socially praiseworthy and politically popular, but it was
also the breeding ground for the subprime crisis and for such setbacks as the
collapse of the GSEs. But what the content of remedial legislation should be,
with regard to the initial mortgage loans to home owners, including the activities
of a CFPA, is beyond the scope of this Article.21 4
210

211

212
213

214

The President's Working Group in its March 2008 interim report recommended that "all states
should implement strong nationwide licensing standards for mortgage brokers" (that is, nonbank
firms that put borrowers and lenders together) and "[t]he Federal Reserve should issue stronger
consumer protection rules and mandate enhanced consumer protection disclosures ....
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Poliy Statement on FinancialMarket Developments
at 3 (cited in note 182).
See Scott, InternationalFinance at 643-45 (cited in note 38) (explaining the moral hazards involved
in the securitization process, citing to several studies).
Consumer Financial Protection Agency, previously mentioned in Section II.C.4.
The author was repeatedly told by young Germans that the 40 percent down payment
requirement was a fact of life for young German couples. The conventional German mortgage,
the Pfandbrief (a covered bond financed mortgage), is by law limited to 60 percent of value. See
Mathilde Franscini and Tamara Schillinger, Mortgage Bond and MBS Market Development in Germany,
Securitization Conduit (Mar 22, 2001).
Another class of regulatory issues beyond the scope of this Article involves those that have
systemic effects on the economy as a whole. Leading examples are proposals for a specialized
resolution mechanism (replacing conventional bankruptcy) for "large, interconnected" financial
firms, especially those deemed "too large to fail," and the creation of a systemic regulator to deal
with issues that threaten the financial system as a whole. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve
addressed both of these issues in a wide-ranging speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. Ben
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the subprime crisis first erupted, the widespread general assumption
was that the crisis arose from the practice of securitization and therefore the way
to prevent a recurrence was to reform financial regulation. But once the chain of
events went on to the credit crunch, the near-failure and even outright failure of
financial institutions, leading to the need for massive bailouts, and then on to the
worst recession since the Great Depression, it became hard to disentangle the
regulatory issues from much broader economic issues. In fact, governmental
attention and legislation came to focus more on bailouts and other means of
saving financial institutions to shield the real economy than on the regulation
issues.
Moreover, looking backward it became clear that defective regulation was
only one cause-perhaps a relatively minor one-comparcd to overly lenient
monetary policy, massive leverage in financial institutions (perhaps even greater
in Europe than in the US), coupled with constantly rising real estate prices and,
with the resulting bubble-induced euphoria, overly lenient attitudes of regulators
toward enforcing rules that were already on the books.
The fact that the recession spread throughout the world led to a need to
address the regulatory issues together with the macroeconomic issues on an
international political level. The vehicle for that exercise became the G20, an
institution that promised much but delivered only quite generalized consensus
agreements because it met at the summit level without the benefit of a
permanent staff to prepare the meetings adequately or to follow up on the
agreements reached.
The result was that it was not until the summer of 2009 that the new
Obama administration was able to make proposals for regulatory reform. And
when those proposals reached Congress, there was a pushback at the
Congressional committee level due to intense lobbying by interest groups and
the complexity of the regulatory issues, and this led to more public attention to
peripheral issues such as bankers' bonuses than to the regulatory issues
themselves. With the economy widely thought to be beginning to recover, the
regulatory proposals of the Administration, parts of which inevitably had both
pros and cons, failed to hold the attention not just of the public but even of key
legislators. Nonetheless, the regulatory issues remain important for the health
not just of the US economy but also, given the interconnectedness of financial
institutions around the world, of the international economy as well.

S. Bernanke, Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, FinancialReform to Address Systemic
Risk (Mar 10, 2009), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bemanke20090310a.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009).
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The analysis of the regulatory issues undertaken, albeit not on a detailed
basis, in this Article suggests that the macroeconomic events that followed on
the subprime crisis have not changed either the nature or the importance of the
regulatory reform issues. Those events have rather shown that financial
regulatory issues may be abstruse, but they are perhaps more important than
heretofore appreciated.
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